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Abstract
Academics and businesspeople have long debate the merits of corporate philanthropy. It is our
contention that this debate is too narrowly focused on the role of corporations. There is a robust
market for philanthropic works – which we call the market for altruism – in which non-profit
organizations, the government, and for-profit corporations compete to do good works. We
describe this market and the role corporations play in satisfying the demand for altruism. We
conclude that corporations should only engage in philanthropy when they have a comparative
advantage over non-profits and the government. Moreover, the government must avoid
discriminating – particularly when setting tax policy – between non-profits and corporations
that do good deeds.
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participants in the Philanthropy Seminar at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago
for their comments. We are grateful to Ruben Rodrigues for his research assistance.

1

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 3
I.

The Existing Debate ....................................................................................................................... 7
A. Why Do Corporations Engage in Philanthropy? ........................................................... 7
B. Should Corporations Engage in Philanthropy? ............................................................. 9

II. The Demand for Altruism ........................................................................................................ 11
III. The Supply of Altruism.............................................................................................................. 12
IV. The Corporate Supply of Altruism ........................................................................................ 14
A. How Corporations Produce Altruism ............................................................................. 15
B. The Comparative Advantage of Corporations ............................................................. 16
1. Economies of Scope ........................................................................................................ 16
2. Bundling to Reduce Free Riding ................................................................................ 18
3. Diversification.................................................................................................................. 20
4. Agency costs ...................................................................................................................... 22
5. Network Effects ................................................................................................................ 23
V. The Merits of Corporate Philanthropy ................................................................................ 24
A. Should Corporations Engage in Philanthropy? ........................................................... 24
B. How Should the Government Regulate Corporate Philanthropy? ....................... 25
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 29
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Appendix B ............................................................................................................................................ 38

2

Introduction
Should corporations be permitted to engage in philanthropy, and, if so, should
they do so? These questions have spawned a decades-long debate among academics and
corporate executives. Milton Friedman fired the first salvo in 1972 with a New York
Times Magazine article in which he asserted that corporations should only make money,
distribute it to shareholders, and let them decide where to spend it.1 Bill Gates joined the
fray last year in his commencement address at Harvard University, when he argued
corporate philanthropy (that is, doing things other than making the most money
possible) is necessary to help those whom markets cannot help.2 (For the record, courts
side with Mr. Gates, though for less lofty reasons.3)
To answer the question whether corporations should engage in philanthropy, we
must first understand why they do it. On this topic scholars have taken three sides. The
first side argues corporate philanthropy is an example of managerial graft: executives
spend corporate profits on their pet charities rather than returning that money to
shareholders. Another side – led by Michael Porter of Harvard Business School – claims
that philanthropy does not siphon profits, it begets them. The reason offered is
philanthropy buys goodwill from consumers, employees, and regulators. (Both of these
first two sides are consistent with Friedman’s normative view that corporate
philanthropy is only appropriate if it increases shareholder wealth.) The final side – the
so-called “corporate social responsibility” movement – believes corporations have a duty
to do good for others, even if it comes at the expense of the bottom line.
All three sides in this debate miss the forest for the trees. To understand why
corporations engage in philanthropy and to know whether they should, one must return
to first principles and explain why anyone engages in philanthropy.4 The answer is
altruism: people feel good when others’ lives are improved.5 Whether an individual
donates money to help the a poor child in Africa or volunteers to mentor a troubled teen,
the reason for the charitable action is the happiness (or, to an economist, the utility)

Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,” NY TIMES
(MAGAZINE), Sept. 13, 1970.
2 Gates’s speech is available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/MediaCenter/Speeches/CoChairSpeeches/BillgSpeeches/BGSpeechHarvard-070607.htm. As it turns out, while this is a good reason
for philanthropy, it is not a good reason for corporate philanthropy. Nor did Mr. Gates truly put his
money where his mouth is. His main contributions to social causes are funneled through the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation.
3 This is not exactly correct. As discussed below, state statutes specifically authorize corporate
philanthropy and courts take a generally hands-off approach, but there are cases that purport to
command a shareholder-wealth-maximization norm. See, for example, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204
Mich. 459 (1919). Dodge, however, does not create a substantive standard that is enforceable in court, but
rather an aspirational goal for corporate directors. The business judgment rule, which applies to
philanthropic decisions just like any other corporate decision, insulates firms from judicial review of
decisions that allegedly do not maximize shareholder value.
4 After all, the current debate the just begs the question why managers engage in altruism or why
consumers, employers and regulators offer good-will in exchange for it.
5 Altruism is well documented, but explanations for its origins are debated. See, for example, H.A.
Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism, 250 SCIENCE 1665 (1990); R.L.
Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 QUARTER. REV. BIO. 35 (1971). This debate is beyond the
scope of this essay. We take it as non-controversial that some individuals are altruistic.
1
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that the individual draws from knowing someone has been helped along..6 With total
charitable activity (money, in-kind, and volunteer donations) totaling nearly $1 trillion
in the United States last year, the demand for altruism is obvious.7
Knowing that individuals demand altruism or charitable utility, we then must ask
how individuals satisfy this demand. At a basic level, altruism is like anything in the
economy that individuals demand; they can produce it themselves or use an
intermediary to deliver it.8 Putting self-production to the side for now,9 the typical
individual satisfies the demand by donating time or money to non-profit organizations.
One can, for example, volunteer at a soup kitchen or donate money to the Red Cross. A
second approach is to pay taxes so that the government can help the downtrodden with
programs like Medicaid and public housing.10
For-profit corporations can also deliver altruism to individuals, and their role in
doing this has increased dramatically in the past few years.11 The conventional, narrow
definition of corporate philanthropy is the donation of cash by corporations to nonprofit organizations, which then in turn are used to help others. Here firms are acting as
aggregators and second-order intermediaries between individuals (that is, shareholders)
and non-profit charities. As discussed below, this is the least compelling, and the
smallest component of how we define “corporate philanthropy.” We use a broader
definition that includes any activity by corporations that helps others without regard to
the bottom line, what we call “corporate social action.” Corporations do not merely
channel funds to non-profits, but do many things to help others at the expense of
corporate profits.12 Firms now produce so-called green goods, voluntarily reduce
environmental emissions, and directly help provide medicines to uninsured. To see why
these are charity, consider corporate commitments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
which are estimated to cost firms tens of billions of dollars per year. Since there is
currently no law or regulation requiring these reductions, there is simply no difference
between a firm donating $100 to an environmental charity and a firm spending $100 to
voluntarily reduce carbon dioxide emissions; both reduce the firm’s profit by $100 with
the goal of improving social welfare.13 We outline these works and their scope in the
There are actually two separate altruistic motivations that we define and unpack a bit more
below. Economists call the two possible motives pure altruism and warm glow. “Pure altruism” is a desire
that other people’s lives be improved, whether or not one contributes to that improvement. “Warm glow”
is a desire actually to contribute to that improvement. Together economists call these preferences,
“impure altruism.” For simplicity we will call them altruism.
7 See Appendix for specific estimates of charitable contributions.
8 Food is an obvious example. Individuals can grow their own, but most rely on specialization to
deliver food at lower prices and with less effort than self-production would require. The same arguments
can be applied to altruism.
9 There are no good estimates of the amount of good individuals do for others without using an
intermediary, so our discussion of the market for altruism ignores self production in the same way that
measures of the size of the economy and competition within it ignores individual self production of goods
and services.
10 Although taxes are mandatory, individuals can engage in various levels of compliance and tax
avoidance, and can, of course, politically support higher or lower tax burdens.
11 See Appendix for a discussion and rough sizing of the relative market share of the various
altruism intermediaries.
12 It even includes payment of corporate taxes that support good works by the government,
though that behavior cannot be deemed voluntary.
13 This may not be literally true, in that there are numerous benefits to managers, shareholders,
customers, employees, and other individuals that must be added up on both sides to determine the true
6
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Appendix A, showing that they equal the amount of good works done by non-profits. To
ignore these activities is to ignore the full scope of a corporation’s charitable work.
Although there should be nothing troubling about firms delivering a new product,
, corporate delivery of altruism is controversial because of how corporations “sell”
altruism. We can see this by comparing the sale of altruism with how firms sell regular
products, like toothpaste or iPods. Ordinarily, corporations obtain financing from
shareholders, use it to purchase labor from employees, who in turn manufacture
products that are sold to consumers. At the end of the day, consumers obtain a product
in return for their payment, employees receive a wage for their labor, and shareholders
get back a financial return on their investment. The production of altruism adds a layer
of complexity to this process. When the corporation engages in philanthropy, this may
satisfy the altruism demand of shareholders, employees, and consumers alike; every
corporate stakeholder may feel good knowing that the firm is helping others. All three
parties also pay: consumers may pay more for the corporation’s products, employees
may take a lower wage to work for the corporation, and shareholders may accept a lower
return on their investment. In other words, whereas only consumers benefit from and
pay for ordinary goods, all stakeholders benefit from and pay for altruism. It is precisely
this contortion of the usual producer-consumer relationship that makes corporate
philanthropy controversial.
If non-profits and the government already help others, and corporate giving is so
contentious, why do people seek altruism from corporations? An advantage that
corporations have over non-profits is that their ordinary profit-making activities
sometimes give corporations an edge at helping the less fortunate. For example,
Starbucks’ procurement of coffee beans puts them in a great position to identify and
encourage productive small farmers in the developing world. Starbucks can offer its
coffee consumers the ability to help these farmers by purchasing fair trade coffee.
Economists call this “economies of scope,” and it is something corporations likely have
that most non-profits do not.
An advantage corporations have over the government is that different
corporations can offer different types of altruism to different people. Those who like the
environment can deal with Patagonia, which has pledged about one percent of profits to
environmental causes, while those who are concerned about poverty in developing
countries can engage with Google, which has made a similar pledge for this cause. The
government by contrast is limited by the political compromises of the entire electorate.
Whatever the reasons behind the rise of corporate philanthropy, its presence
highlights that people “purchase” altruism like they do other goods. Unlike automobiles,
accounting services, or cell phones, however, three types of organizations—non-profits,
the government, and for-profit corporations—provide individuals opportunities to buy
altruism. Each competes on price and quality to sell altruism to consumers, just as
corporations compete when selling other goods. We call this dynamic the “market for
social value of these options. For example, reducing carbon dioxide emissions may preempt more costly
regulatory intervention, and thus reduce the firm’s ongoing expenses, while donations to charity may be
more conspicuous and generate goodwill for the firm, which also may reduce future costs or increase
future revenues. If such overcompliance is intended merely to forestall government regulation, then it
more like government social work outsourced to corporations. If, however, it is overcompliance to
engender the goodwill of private stakeholders, then it is no different than donations to a non-profit or
direct social action.
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altruism,” since there is competition for altruism dollars just as there is for all other
goods and services in the economy.14
This recharacterization and framework helps us answer the two questions that
drive the debate over corporate philanthropy. First, a corporation should only engage in
philanthropy when it is efficient for it to do so, that is, when it has a comparative
advantage over other corporations and, importantly, non-profit organizations and the
government.15 When a corporation is acting merely as a pass through—simply donating
corporate profits to non-profits—it must justify why it should not step out of the way
and let shareholders make these donations directly.
Second, the government should not prohibit or discourage corporate
philanthropy in general, since firms are important and often efficient providers of
altruism. We show below that for-profit firms help complete the market for altruism by
offering individuals who would not otherwise be able to satisfy their altruistic
preferences an opportunity to do so. For a well-functioning market, however, the
government must do more than this – it must be careful not to discriminate without
good reason among various providers of altruism. One source of discrimination is
government favoritism of itself. The government is, unusually,16 a competitor in the
market for altruism, and because it can compel individuals to purchase altruism from it
through taxes, it may favor itself at the expense of charities or firms wanting to help
others. This potential for crowd out of potentially efficient providers of altruism is real
and should be resisted, but it is not the most serious concern.
The government also writes the rules for philanthropy, largely through tax
benefits for certain types of philanthropy, and it may discriminate in an inefficient
manner here too. For example, a taxpayer that itemizes her deductions can deduct a
charitable contribution to a non-profit from her taxable income, but she cannot deduct a
charitable purchase from a for-profit corporation. This discrimination is just as bad for
competition – and consumers – as if the government favored General Motors over Ford
in the market for cars. If the tax rules are not tailored to reflect the relative merits of the
different delivery mechanisms or providers, consumers would not choose the product
that is best for them, but rather the product that is favored by the government. The
recipients of altruism may also be hurt, since they would get less or lower quality aid
than if the tax rules were nondiscriminatory.
Our bottom line is simple: companies exist to deliver value to employees,
customers, and investors, and firms are providing these stakeholders increasing
opportunities to satisfy their demand for altruism as a component of this value. Asking
why firms produce altruism is like asking why Toyota produces the Camry or Apple
produces the iPod Nano. The answer is because there is consumer demand for it and the
company is able to produce it at competitive cost. Government, which is both a
competitor and rule setter in this market for altruism, is acting inefficiently along
several dimensions, and reforms are needed to level the playing field in the market so
that altruism is delivered efficiently to individuals demanding it and those who benefit
We discuss some elements of this market competition in detail below. It is important to note
here that this “market” is not exactly like the market for automobiles or accounting services. We explore
these differences below.
15 See section IV.
16 Non-profits and the government compete in the market for education and all three occasionally
compete in the market for health and health insurance.
14
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from it. To make our argument, the rest of this essay proceeds as follows: Section I
reviews the existing debate over the merits of corporation philanthropy, asking why
corporations engage in philanthropy and whether they should. Section II presents the
foundation of our theory of corporate philanthropy. It describes why people demand
charitable works and how corporations provide them. Section III considers the roles of
non-profits and the government as the traditional suppliers of altruism. Section IV then
examines corporate philanthropy, showing how firms may have a comparative
advantage over non-profits and the government at delivering altruism in certain
circumstances. With the importance of corporate philanthropy in the market for
altruism established, section V shows how government discrimination in the market for
altruism – in favor of itself and of certain types of giving – is inefficient and needs to be
reformed to ensure altruism is delivered in an efficient manner.
I. The Existing Debate
The bulk of the academic literature on corporate philanthropy tackles the
question why corporations engage in philanthropy. One’s answer to this question is a
good predictor of one’s answer to question that occupies public discourse, should
corporations engage in philanthropy. We review the sides in this debate to set the stage
for our theory of philanthropy.
A. Why Do Corporations Engage in Philanthropy?
Prominent scholars such as Michael Porter argue that philanthropy helps the
bottom line and can be a source of competitive advantage.17 Numerous studies claim to
support the link between giving and profit.18 The mechanism is generating good feelings
from customers, suppliers, or employees;19 reducing turnover of employees;20 or
decreasing the risk of government or activist action.21 Whether the source of the goodwill
and increased profits is the advertising benefits of doing good or something else is beside
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy,
HARV. BUS. REV. 58 (Dec. 2002) (arguing that “social and economic goals are not inherently conflicting but
integrally connected.”).
18 See Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic
Releases and Economic Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENV. ECON. & MANAGE 1, 14 (1999) (donating to
charity leads to greater returns on capital); see also, Seema Arora & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Toward a
Theoretical Model of Voluntary Overcompliance, 28 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 289, 305 (1995); L. S.
Moir & R.J. Taffler, Does Corporate Philanthropy Exist?, 54 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 156 (2004) (analyzing
gifts to the arts by 60 firms, and finding that were justified almost entirely by profit maximization).
19 Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and Company Contributions to
Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 82, 100 (1988) (describing how good feelings of customers, suppliers, and
employees leads to greater brand value).
20 Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. Turban, Corporate Social Performance as a Competitive
Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 39 BUS. & SOCIETY 254, 261 (2000) (finding that corporate
giving reduces employee turnover); see also Jeanne M. Logsdon, et al., Corporate Philanthropy:
Strategic Responses to the Firm's Stakeholders, 19 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUART. 93, 104
(1990) (same).
21 David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 10
J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 7, 18 (2001) (finding that giving reduces risks of government or activist
action).
17
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the point.22 All that matters is that the firm is actually doing some public good and that
the act of doing this helps not only strangers to the firm but also its shareholders.23 Even
Milton Friedman, who famously claimed that the “only . . . responsibility of business [is]
to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits,”
acknowledged that corporate philanthropy may be justified when it is necessary to
maximize long-run profits.24
Other scholars argue that philanthropy is simply managerial graft, and in this way
no different than a CEO using a fancy corporate jet.25 Managers are spending other
people’s money, and, because monitoring by shareholders is imperfect, managers will do
so in ways that maximize their own utility not that of the shareholders. Numerous
studies claim to support this view.26 The agency-costs account is supported by the fact
that the law does not require corporate gifts to charity be disclosed to shareholders and
that many firms do not do so.27 Proponents of this view call into question the causal
connection between donations and profits relied on by the opposing camp. They argue
that profits, or their expectation, may allow corporations to be more generous thus
explaining the observed correlation between corporate success and philanthropy.
The empirical research is not conclusive, but suggests that corporate philanthropy
reflects a blend of these motives. Even studies finding evidence consistent with profit22 Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity?, 61 J. BUS. 65, 73 (1988) (concluding
that corporate contributions represent a form of advertising, as firms that spend more on advertising also
tend to give more to charity).
23 Indeed, Einer Elhauge has suggested that shareholders may draw non-financial utility from
corporate social actions even if they lower corporate profits. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
24 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,” NY TIMES
(MAGAZINE), Sept. 13, 1970.
25 See, for example, F.S. Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 586 (1997). See also J. Boatsman & S. Gupta, Taxes and
corporate charity: empirical evidence from micro-level panel data 49 National Tax J. 193, 200 (1996)
(examining changes in firm contributions in response to a change in marginal tax rates and concluding
that charitable contributions go beyond what would be profit maximizing); James R. Boatsman & Sanjay
Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity: Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data, 49 NAT'L TAX J.
193 (1996) (data on corporate philanthropy consistent with managers' utility maximization rather than
profit maximization); Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J.
BUS. ETHICS 745, 747-48 (1993) (concluding that the empirical evidence suggests that corporate giving is
primarily motivated by citizenship interests); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet
Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997) (disregarding any profit or tax
motives, and imputing much of donation to the personal (largely selfish) motives of CEOs); Jill E. Fisch,
Corporate Philanthropy from the Perspective of Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1091 (1997) (concluding that corporate giving is motivated by management self-interest because studies
that fail to find a link between giving and profitability).
26 See Eric Helland & Janet Kiholm, "Corporate Philanthropy," Working Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=472161. See also L. Atkinson & J. Galaskiewicz, Stock ownership and company
contributions to charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 82 (1988) (finding that among about 70 public firms in
Minneapolis, companies with a higher percentage of ownership by the CEO or with a large blockholder
give less to charity); Bruce Seifert, et. al, Having, Giving, and Getting: Slack Resources, Corporate
Philanthropy, and Firm Financial Performance, 43 BUS. & SOCIETY, 135, 143 (2004) (finding that
generous firms have much higher free cash flow at the discretion of managers).
27 For example, the New York Stock Exchange lists charitable organizations as relevant in
determining the independence of directors, see NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A(b)(2)(V),
and requires firms to adopt governance guidelines including, inter alia, consideration of payments made
to charities affiliated with directors, see id. at Section 303A(b)(9).
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maximizing motives,28 also find companies with lower agency costs—greater monitoring
by creditors, more independent boards, less free cash available to managers—gave less to
charity than other firms.29 We think these studies fairly capture reality: both positive
theories are more or less true and will be present at various levels in most cases.30 Just a
CEO’s decision about the use of a corporate jet may be motivated by both personal and
shareholder concerns, it would be surprising if decisions about doing good for others
were not mostly based on mixed motives.
In light of the inevitable mixed motives and the inability of courts ex post to
distinguish between “good” and “bad” philanthropy made by firms ex ante, the law takes
a very agnostic view. This was not always the case. Prior to 1960, donations to charity
were considered beyond the power of the firm.31 But how is a court to determine whether
a donation to Princeton University or a commitment to pay higher wages to autoworkers
or a decision to not install lights at Wrigley Field is a profit maximizing decision or a
charitable one?32 After all, a decision to refrain from polluting beyond that required by
law is as much charity as a gift to the opera, and if courts are in the business of making
these distinctions, regulatory laws become not only minimums but maximums. In this
way, the law’s permissive attitude toward corporations doing good (in all forms) is an
inevitable result of the business judgment rule—courts stay out of the business of
second-guessing business decisions in an attempt to minimize the sum of decision costs
and error costs, and the decision to act charitably, whether it is by donating money or not
acting badly, is a quintessential business decision.33
B. Should Corporations Engage in Philanthropy?
It should not be surprising that scholars who believe that corporate philanthropy
helps the bottom line support it and scholars who believe corporate philanthropy is an
example of managerial graft oppose it. The common goal in both camps is the
promotion of shareholder interests.
See Helland & Kiholm, “Corporate Philanthropy,” at 23, supra note __. See also Theodore
Eisenberg, et. al, Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 41
(1998).
29 See supra note __. Other evidence, like larger relative giving by firms in regulated industries,
conceivably cuts both ways: regulated firms may be giving to build goodwill with regulators (and thereby
reduce regulation and increase profits) or may simply face less competition and therefore have greater
managerial discretion over cash flows. See id.
30 See Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity?” 61 J. BUS. 65 (1988) (arguing that
profit maximization and agency cost explanations are not mutually exclusive).
31 See F.S. Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 582 note 7 (1997).
32 See AP Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 NJ 145, 98 A.2d 581 (NJ1953) (holding that gift from
plumbing supply company to Princeton justified as reasonable and calculated to benefit shareholders);
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919) (holding that increase in wages for workers—Ford’s
famous $5-dollar day—was not impermissible charitable donation); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d
173 (1968) (holding that decision to not install lights at Wrigley Field to benefit baseball and the local
neighborhood was permissible exercise of business judgment).
33 Today, nearly all state corporate law statutes specifically authorize boards “to make donations
for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes.” See, for example, D.G.C.L.
section 122(9). This protects specific donations; corporate activities that improve social welfare, like the
overcompliance with environmental laws, are protected under the business judgment rule.
28
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There is, however, a third camp in the normative debate over whether
corporations should engage in philanthropy. Comprised mainly of progressive
academics, this camp champions the cause of “corporate social responsibility.” Their
argument is founded on either a moral claim (firms have an abstract moral duty to do
good) or a historical one (firms are licensed by the State, and therefore must serve it).
Whatever the case, they assert that managers have an obligation to focus on more than
profits, the more being some unspecified amalgamation of the interests of employees,
communities, governments, and other “stakeholders”.34 Although undoubtedly opposed
to managerial graft, the proponents of corporate social responsibility may simply view
this as a cost that is exceeded by the benefits of corporate philanthropy. They do not
care about the impact on corporate profits.
Milton Friedman summarizes the opposing view:
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than
making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to
know what it is? Can self-selected private individuals decide
what the social interest is? Can they decide how great a
burden they are justified in placing on themselves or their
stockholders to serve that social interest? Is it tolerable that
these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control
be exercised by the people who happen at the moment to be
in charge of particular enterprises, chosen for those posts by
strictly private groups?35
Friedman’s criticism is basically that one needs an underlying theory of political
philosophy to make sense of the call for, in the abstract, greater corporate contribution to
the public good.36 Managers installed by shareholders to make money for shareholders
are poorly positioned to know what the public good is or to know how best to deliver it.
While we agree with the critics of the corporate social responsibility movement
that firms should give shareholders and customers only what they want, we believe that
this demand increasingly is for corporate social action designed to make the world a
better place. In other words, while Friedman believes shareholders care about only
profits, we believe they increasingly care about utility, which is the sum of financial
returns and the good feeling that comes with knowing their investments are doing good
for others. (Evidence that shareholders care about utility, not just money, is evidenced
by the rise of the socially responsible investing, which we describe below.) The practical
result of our view may not be that different from what the corporate social responsibility
movement desires, but will be more focused on the efficiency of altruism delivery as
opposed to imposing it on every firm. We will take this as license to focus our attention
on whether philanthropy promotes the corporate rather than social interest. Since this
boils does to why corporations engage in philanthropy, we now offer our own answer to
this question.
34 See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2005).
35 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 133-34.
36 See David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979).
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II. The Demand for Altruism
Existing explanations for why corporations engage in philanthropy all pass the
buck. Proponents of corporate philanthropy argue that it engenders goodwill from
shareholders, employees, consumers or regulators. (In doing so philanthropy lowers the
corporation’s costs or raises the price it can charge.) But this just raises the question:
why does philanthropy engender the goodwill of these other parties? Opponents of
corporate philanthropy make the same error. They assert that philanthropy is an
example of managers wasting shareholder money on their pet charities. But why do
managers spend it on charity rather than, say, a bigger office or more lavish corporate
parties?
It is our contention that to understand why corporations engage in philanthropy,
we need a theory for why anyone – from shareholders to consumers to regulators –
engages in philanthropy. Our answer starts with the premise that at least some people
feel better when they help others.37 This pleasure may derive from being the giver or
from knowing that someone received a gift. In economic terms, utility derived from
giving is called “warm glow,” and the utility derived when someone’s welfare is
improved is called “pure altruism.”38 Philanthropy exists because individuals have
preferences for altruism and philanthropic organizations are simply third parties that
offer individuals the opportunity to satisfy these preferences in an efficient manner
(relative to self production).
We show below that firm stakeholders (employees, customers, investors, etc.) get
utility from firm actions designed to help others at the expense of wages, product value,
or profits. For example, employees may accept lower wages, customers may pay more
for the same product if bundled with altruism, and investors may accept lower returns.39
Whether this utility is “warm glow” or “pure altruism” is impossible to know and is
largely irrelevant. Some stakeholders will do this because it makes them feel good that
others are helped, some will do so because they like the way it makes them feel being
associated with a firm that does good, and some will do so for a mix of these reasons.
Whatever the case, the firm is simply delivering altruism to these individuals, just as if
they got only money from the firm, and then made donations on their own.
Under this view, all that existing proponents of corporate philanthropy are saying
is that corporation satisfy the altruistic demands of shareholders, employees, consumers
and regulators when they engage in philanthropy. Likewise, opponents merely assert
that managers use corporate assets to satisfy their own demand for altruism.40
We recognize this is a complex question, and that much ink has been spilled debating whether
individuals are inherently selfish or altruistic, and, if the latter, what the evolutionary reason is for this.
See, for example, H.A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism, 250 SCIENCE
1665 (1990); R.L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 QUARTER. REV. BIO. 35 (1971). We
don’t weigh in on this debate, but rather simply look at the amount of charitable contributions and
activities in the market—about $1 trillion last year—as evidence of some individual preferences for
altruism.
38 Together these two types are called “impure altruism,” since the warm glow component is
considered a selfish motive. For simplicity, we refer to the combination simply as “altruism.”
39 We document evidence for these tradeoffs in the Appendix.
40 Cynics will argue that managers are not truly altruistic. Rather they engage in corporate
philanthropy only to bolster their own image in the community. But, again, this just begs the question:
37
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Opponents would surely argue that our recharacterization does not fully capture their
claim, which is that managers should not be allowed to use corporate assets for any
purpose, including altruism. We will address this point when we describe how
corporations produce altruism. The lesson of this section is that our simple claim about
the demand for altruism captures both sides of the debate over corporate philanthropy.
There is the residual question of which side is correct: does corporate
philanthropy serve shareholders, employees and consumers or it does it serve top
managers? Our answer is “all of the above.” Some corporations – Occidental
Petroleum41 comes to mind – may favor managers over other stakeholders. But others –
such as Toyota with its hybid cars or Target with is charitable contributions – probably
favor consumers or employees over others. We do not believe all corporations are the
same. Different corporations serve different consumer groups, even in the case of
altruism. Nor do we believe that all corporations are behaving optimally. Some may too
generous to managers’ pet charities and others may be overinvested in green consumer
products.
The only thing we resist is unconditional claims that corporations should always
engage in philanthropy or always abstain from it. Just as with ordinary products, a
better approach is a case-by-case analysis of when corporations should enter a specific
altruistic market and when it should remain on the sidelines. A key step in this analysis
is identifying its potential competitors. This is the topic to which we now turn.
III. The Supply of Altruism
Altruism is like anything else that individuals demand, it generates production by
suppliers in a market. Viewed in this way, a non-profit charity soliciting donations to
help victims of a hurricane is selling “altruism,” that is, satisfying some combination of
donors’ desires to be involved in helping the victims and have the victims be helped. The
same is true when the government collects taxes to pay for social programs and when
for-profit firm takes actions that sacrifice profits in the public interest. In all these cases,
individuals demand something, in this case utility from giving and doing good, and
suppliers provide it for them.
There are of course important differences between the three producers of
altruism. Non-profit organizations are – as their name suggests – prohibited from
distributing profits to their stakeholders. They are also limited in the activities in which
they can engage. In return for these restrictions, they are exempt from corporate income
taxes.42 (Consumers who purchase altruism from non-profit organizations through
donations of cash or assets are also given certain tax breaks, but we shall address that
topic in Section V.)
Because the activities non-profits are permitted to do (those with “religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes”) overlap
with much of the demand for altruism, non-profits are thought to be the primary
why does such philanthropy help the reputation of managers? The answer is that other members of the
community value philanthropy and exchange their respect for philanthropy engineered by the manager.
41 Armand Hammer, the head of Occidental Petroleum, had the board donate one-third of the
firm’s profits in one year to build a museum to house his personal art collection. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594
A.2d 48 (Del. 1992) (finding no wrongdoing in the gift).
42 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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producer of altruism. Indeed, the conventional notion of corporate philanthropy –
donations by corporations to non-profits – implicitly accepts the market dominance of
non-profit organizations.
The second major producer of altruism is the government. It is unusual to find
the government participating as a producer in any market, especially in America, where
the public believes strongly in the primacy of private enterprise. The reason for the
government participation in the market for altruism is that pure altruism – one of the
two drivers of the demand for altruism – is a public good43 and is therefore undersupplied in private markets.44 Government actions that substitute for charitable
endeavors can help solve the free-riding problem because the mandatory nature of
charitable giving to the government (that is, taxes).
The free riding problem can be understood by recalling that “pure altruism” is
one individual’s concern about the welfare of another. The purely altruistic individual
experiences joy whenever his preferred beneficiary receives money, even if that money
did not come from the pure altruist. All that matters is that the beneficiary’s welfare is
improved. Ironically, this idyllic state of affairs leads to rational free riding by the pure
altruist. If anyone’s contribution to the beneficiary confers joy upon the pure altruist, it
is entirely rational for the pure altruist to wait for others to help the beneficiary and save
his income for personal consumption. Since all rational pure altruists will behave this
way, the beneficiary will lack for care and no pure altruist will be satisfied.45
The usual solution to free riding problem is to make contributions to public goods
mandatory. The government does this by imposing taxes and using the proceeds to
produce public goods. This can explain a good portion of government production of
altruism. If the government did not provide medical care to the indigent through
Medicaid, it is very unlikely that the private sector would completely fill the gap. Even if
one cared about the health of the poor, why donate money to the cause when someone
else’s contribution provides the same altruistic satisfaction as your own? The
government appreciates this and funds Medicaid via (mandatory) tax revenues.
Although government spending largely targets pure-altruism activities that are
prone to free riding, the government still competes to some extent with the non-profit
sector. For example, Arthur Brooks’s research on private charity finds that, after
controlling for income, education, age, religion, gender, marital status, race, and
political views, those in favor of government action to improve social welfare are 10
percentage points less likely to give to private charities than those who do not favor a
A public good is one that is non-rival (one persons consumption does not preclude another’s)
and non-excludable (one person cannot stop another from consuming the product). See Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
44 Implicit in this argument is that, while certain activities can satisfy both warm glow and purely
altruistic preferences, they do not always do so. There may be some activities which are driven largely by
warm glow and other that mainly satisfy purely altruistic preferences. Examples of the former are the
construction of a fancy University building, which gives the donor warm glow but only marginally benefits
students, or a personal act of kindness that is not revealed to and thus cannot confer purely altruistic
benefit upon others. An example of the latter is an anonymous donation to pay for an especially sick
child’s surgery. The limited cost of the surgery caps the number of people who can donate and obtain
warm glow, while press coverage of the surgery permits the entire population to draw purely altruistic
benefits from the child’s care.
45 This is an obvious overstatement, but it is likely true on the margin, meaning there will be some
rational free riding and thus less altruism than optimal.
43
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government role. He concludes that “[p]eople who favor government income
redistribution are significantly less likely to [give to charity] than those who do not.”46
This is not a recent phenomenon. Jonathan Gruber’s research suggests that half of the
nearly 30 percentage point drop in gifts to private charity during the Great Depression
were the result of government extensions in serving the needy.47 Economists call this
“crowd out” since mandatory contributions reduce (or crowd out) voluntary
contributions from other sources. There is less evidence as to the government’s ability to
crowd out corporate philanthropy, but we offer some evidence below in support of this
too. Interestingly, crowd-out in this market is a two way street. Because the government
grants tax breaks for donations to non-profits and, in some cases, corporate
philanthropy, patronage of these two sectors decreases taxes paid to the government.
The result is a form a reverse crowd out.48
The third competitor in the market for altruism is the for-profit corporation. In the
next section, we describe how corporations produce altruism and explore the
comparative advantage they have over their non-profit and government competitors.
IV. The Corporate Supply of Altruism
Corporate philanthropy has a rocky history. One of the most famous corporate
law cases of all time involves a dispute about the alleged eleemosynary motives of Henry
Ford in increasing wages to the famous $5 day.49 Ford’s plan was not really charity, but
was motivated by purely business interests, namely to reduce chronic turnover in his
factories.50 Nevertheless, the Michigan courts interjected themselves to some degree,
and established an aspirational standard of shareholder wealth maximization for
corporate boards to follow, although not an enforceable legal standard.51 Modern courts
and legislatures are more permissive, allowing or specifically authorizing corporate
donations to charity. But the cases, statutes, and academic criticism focus largely on
corporate donations to charities, as opposed to the good works that firms do themselves.
46 ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES? THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT COMPASSIONATE
CONSERVATIVISM, 55-57 (2006). See also J. Schiff, Does Government Spending Crowd Out Charitable
Contributions?, 38 NATIONAL TAX J. 535, 540-41 (1985) (finding that states that increase spending on the
needy see a reduction in charity).
47 Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, “Faith-Based Charity and Crowd-Out During the
Great Depression,” Working Paper No. 1132, NBER 2005, http://www.nber.org/papers/W11332.
48 There is an international component of this story too. While European and Asian governments
contributed more in absolute dollars (and much more on a per GNP basis) than the American government
to aid the victims of the 2004 tsunami (for example, Germany gave $674 million and Japan gave $500
million compared with only $350 million from the U.S.), private contributions by Americans made up for
the difference: “Americans donated more than $1.5 billion in cash and gifts.” BROOKS, WHO REALLY
CARES?, supra note ___ at 117. Extrapolating back to the homefront, this suggests a view of welfare that is
the sum of public and private efforts, with the United States relying on a mix with a heavier weight of
private efforts.
49 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 204 Mich. 459 (1919) (establishing a shareholder wealth
maximization norm for corporate boards).
50 See M. Todd Henderson, “The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,” in CORPORATE LAW
STORIES, Mark Ramseyer, ed. (forthcoming 2009). The link between corporate charity for workers and the
bottom line was also a key feature of company towns, which were ubiquitous for the five decades after the
Civil War. See M. Todd Henderson, “The Nanny Corporation,” Univ. of Chicago Law School Working
Paper (on file with author).
51 See id.
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This latter type of philanthropy has grown dramatically over the past few decades, and a
reconsideration of the manner in which it is delivered and why is both timely and
important to getting the rules right. It is to these issues that we now turn.
A. How Corporations Produce Altruism
In Economics 101 students learn how corporations provide goods like toothpaste
for consumers. Corporations use financial capital from shareholders and labor from
employees to manufacture toothpaste and then sell that toothpaste for a price to
consumers. The price that the consumer pays reimburses the shareholders for their
capital and the employees for their labor. Shareholders and employees exchange capital
and labor, respectively, in exchange for money. The consumer exchanges money for
toothpaste. At the end of the day, only the consumer is left with a consumable good,
which in this case satisfies a demand for clean teeth and fresh minty breath.
How corporations satisfy the demand for altruism is dramatically different.
Shareholders may still provide investment capital, the employee may still provide labor,
and the consumer may provide purchase money, but the corporation’s good works may
provide a consumable good for all three stakeholders. When Microsoft gives free
computers to schools, all the stakeholders may be happier; workers and investors may
benefit from participating in a firm that does good works. We offer empirical evidence
for the willingness to trade cash (either in labor or investment income) for charitable
utility in Appendix A.
Just as consumers are charged for toothpaste, shareholders may be asked to
accept a lower return on their capital, employees may be asked to accept a lower wage
per hour, and consumers – they just do as they did before – pay a purchase price, but in
this case one that exceeds what they would otherwise pay. Since shareholders and
employees are paying for (and receiving) some of the altruism the corporation produces,
the consumer does not pay for (and receive) all the altruism the corporation produces.52
The lesson is that, in the case of philanthropy, the clear lines between who does
the producing and who does the consuming may be blurred. This blurring is
controversial simply because it is non-traditional. Some people think that corporations
harm shareholders when they engage in philanthropy; but they ignore that shareholders
may also benefit from that philanthropy. The shareholders provide capital and get back
both a financial returns and altruistic consumption. If the shareholders don’t value the
altruism, they can go invest in another corporation that only offers a financial return.
Not surprisingly, we observe this segmentation of the market – some investors choose
socially responsible investment funds, which necessarily earn a lower return and thus
embed a charitable contribution in the investment, while others may go simply for the
monetary return.53

An interesting implication is that when a corporation produces altruism, it is behaving like a
producer cooperative, albeit with specialized workers. There is a large economics literature that
documents how cooperatives behave differently – and perhaps less efficiently – that shareholder-owned
firms producing widget. See, for example, Philip K. Porter and Gerald W. Scully, Economic Efficiency in
Cooperatives, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 491 (1987). What is less clear is whether this implies that corporations
are more or less efficient than non-profits or the government at producing altruistic goods.
53 See Appendix A for a discussion of the socially responsible investing phenomenon.
52
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The following graphic illustrates the various players in the market for altruism
and our estimates of the relative sizes of the mechanisms through which altruism is
demanded and delivered. We derive the numbers referenced in Appendix A.

Figure 1. The Market for Altruism

B. The Comparative Advantage of Corporations
We have already explained why governments and non-profits participate in
altruistic markets. What is less clear is why corporations do. Why don’t they – as Milton
Friedman once suggested – focus on turning profits off widgets? The reason is that
corporations may have a comparative advantage over both non-profits and the
government in producing certain altruistic goods, and therefore in satisfying the
altruistic utility demand of corporate stakeholders.
1. Economies of Scope
One such advantage is that for-profit corporations may be more efficient at
producing certain altruistic goods because of economies of scope between the private
goods they typically produce and the altruistic good.54 An obvious example is that
Starbucks may be better at providing income support to Third World coffee farmers
than non-profits or governments that simply donate cash to the same farmers.
54 There are economies of scope between the production of two goods if the produce can lower its
costs of producing one of the goods by also producing the other good. For example, goods A and B may
each cost $1 to produce separately, but cost $0.75 each to produce together.
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Starbucks pays fair trade prices (typically 75 percent above competitive prices) for
farmers who produce coffee rather than simply transferring money to them. This
encourages farmers to work in order to receive welfare; unconditional welfare might
discourage work and encourage dependency.55 What’s more, Starbucks already has a
distribution channel to farmers in place, meaning it can deliver social action at less cost
than a provider that must make an investment in a redundant distribution network.
Non-profits do not have such low-cost access to these farmers, nor does the government.
Another example of economies of scope is the monitoring of working conditions
in factories in developing countries by clothing and footwear manufacturers. After
negative press coverage of Nike’s use of factories with unsafe conditions and employing
children, consumers demanded better working conditions for workers in developing
countries. The government or non-profits could have been used to satisfy this altruistic
demand, but the most efficient mechanism for delivering this public good was through
for-profit corporations. Nike created an internal department to monitor the health,
safety, and environmental conditions in over 700 of its factories in 50 countries.56 Nike
is clearly the most efficient party to design, implement, and monitor higher standards
for these nearly 600,000 workers, since it would be highly costly for a non-profit to put
in place systems and monitors at all of these locations.57
The production of hybrid cars by automobile companies is yet another example of
economics of scope. Consumers are increasingly demanding a solution to the problem of
climate change, and automakers are meeting this altruistic demand.58 Hybrid cars can
be thought of as simply a bundle of a fuel-efficient car and a donation to pay for research
and development expenses on hybrid engines or to help the environment. (We know this
because hybrids are more costly than equally fuel efficient gas-only cars. The only
explanation for this additional payment—as opposed to a simple donation of the
difference in price to an environmental charity—is that consumers are contributing to a
public good, namely research on hybrids.59) Clearly car manufacturers are in a better
position than non-profits or the government to research hybrid engines, if for no other
reason than that they need to merge those engines with the rest of the cars they
produce.60
See, for example, LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT (2001).
See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor
Standards and Monitoring, 31 POLICY STUDIES J. 10 (2003). Another example is Ikea, which monitors the
use of child labor by suppliers of its rugs from India. See id.
57 Michael Vandenbergh’s important work on private provision of public goods is instructive here.
See Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. at 2035-36, supra note __.
58 The need for action by for-profit firms arises in part because the lack of a political solution to
the problem. This is related to the problem discussed below about diversification. The point is simply that
political consensus may be difficult to reach on certain issues, and firms can meet this demand more
efficiently. See M. Todd Henderson, “The Nanny Corporation,” Univ. of Chicago Law School Working
Paper (on file with author).
59 It is true that the federal government provides tax breaks to promote sales of hybrids. However,
these breaks do not fully offset the additional cost of hybrids. For a list of tax breaks, see
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax_hybrid.shtml. Moreover, the tax breaks have expired for many
cars, but demand has not. See id.
60 This advantage comports well with an account of strategic corporate philanthropy made by
Michael Porter and Mark Kramer. See Kramer & Porter, supra note __ at 68 (“[T]he more closely a
company’s philanthropy is linked to its competitive context, the greater the company’s contribution to
society will be. Other areas, where the company neither creates added value nor derives benefit, should
55

56
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Other examples are readily available, but we should not overstate the case.
Corporate social action is not a perfect substitute for other types of charitable or
governmental good works, but rather are complimentary and sometimes only
moderately so. Corporate philanthropy will work better or worse at some times for some
causes and by some firms. At other times it won’t work well and may be a sign of
managerial graft. Competition in product, labor, and capital markets should help sort
these successes and failures in a fairly efficient manner.
2. Bundling to Reduce Free Riding
A second advantage that for-profit corporations have is that they may be better
than non-profits – though not the government61 – at reducing free riding in the
production of pure altruism. The reason is that corporations bundle private goods with
altruistic public goods.62 Because of economies of scope between the two goods, their
combination changes the relative prices of the public and private goods in ways that lead
to a greater production of public goods than if the two goods were offered separately.
Bundling will either (a) lower the relative price of the public good and make it more
attractive for direct purchase, or (b) will make the private good more attractive and,
because of the bundling, more of the public good will indirectly be purchased.
To see this, consider the corporate bundles we used above: Starbucks fair trade
coffee bundles regular coffee with a transfer to Third World farmers; and Toyota’s
hybrids bundle a regular car with a contribution to the environment in the form of lower
carbon dioxide emissions or research on fuel-efficient engines. The companies offer
these bundles because it increases the total value of the sum of the two separate items
above their value if sold separately. Consumers could purchase each component (coffee
and monetary transfer to farmers; car and contribution to the environment) separately,
but buy them together because there are economies of scope between bundled
components.63 This implies that, for the same amount of money, consumers can buy
appropriately be left – as Friedman asserts – to individual donors following their own charitable
impulses.”).
61 Recall that the government solves free riding with mandatory contributions to altruistic public
goods.
62 Another reason that corporations may be able to reduce free riding is, ironically, managerial
graft. The main argument against corporate donations is that they are they are given by managers serving
their own preferences (or reputation) rather than those of shareholders. But even purely altruistic
shareholders have an incentive to free ride. So when a manager ignores shareholders’ preferences, they
also ignore the incentive to free ride. Thus managerial graft may, fortuitously, reduce free riding. There
are two limits to this reasoning that keep us from including it in the main text. First, it requires managers
to be motivated by warm glow (or reputation) while shareholders are motivated by pure altruism.
Otherwise they too would simply free ride on others production of pure altruism. But why would
managers have different preferences, especially since they too are shareholders in other companies? This
disconnect is partly bridged by the fact that managers are spending shareholders’ money and even pure
altruists would buy a free public good. Yet all models of managerial wage under asymmetric information
find that graft to some extent trades off with wage, that is, that higher opportunities for graft is a form of
compensation that reduces wages. Therefore managers’ donations are not entirely free. Second, manager’s
preference among charities might not match those of shareholders. For example, managers may like the
local opera while shareholders like helping soup kitchens.
63 This point is different than the first comparative advantage we have highlighted. The first was
that corporations, because of economies of scope, may be able to produce the altruistic public good more
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more of each component than they could if the components were not bundled. This in
turn implies that the bundle changes the relative prices of the two components.
This change in prices or amounts is illustrated in Figure 2. Unbundled goods can
be purchased at an exchange rate of q parts private good (x) for 1 part altruistic public
good (y). Assuming the consumer’s income M is 1, this relative price yields a linear
budget constraint labeled C. So the consumer can buy 1/q units of the unbundled private
good or 1 unit of the unbundled public good or some combination along C. We have
drawn the consumer’s indifference curve U so that she chooses combination xC and yC.

x

less y

1/q

xc

C*
C
yc

1

y

Figure 2. Effect of bundling on purchase of altruistic public good.

For bundling to be attractive, the budget constraint must expand to some C* that
lies to the right of C.64 Any combination of private and public goods that is on C* and to
the right of the consumer’s original indifference curve U will improve the consumer’s
utility. The consumer will abandon her original choice (xC, yC) only for one of these
combinations. If the consumer’s indifference curves are such that they touch C* to the
right of yC, that is, in the shaded portion of Figure 2, the consumer will purchase more
public good. If the consumer chooses a point on C* where the slope of C* is flatter than
C, then the consumer’s choice is driven a lower relative price of the public good, that is,
the consumer is substituting from buying private good to buying the public good. If the
consumer chooses a point on C* where the slope of C* is steeper than C, then the
consumer is buying more of the private good, but getting more of the public good simply
efficiently, whether the demand for that good is driven by warm glow or pure altruism. The current point
is that this joint efficiency helps reduce free riding when consumers are driven by pure altruism.
64 We have arbitrarily drawn such a C*. In contrast to our smooth and continuous depiction, C*
may be a single point or piecewise linear. This will not affect our conclusion.
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because they are bundled. Either way more altruism is produced through bundling than
could be produced by buying altruism alone.65
The main lesson to take away from Figure 2 is that bundling—due to economies
of scope—increases the purely altruistic consumer’s expenditure on the altruistic public
good because it either reduces the relative price of that good or increases consumption
of the private good, which fortuitously is bundled with the altruistic public good. Either
way, the result is less free riding on other consumers’ contribution to that public good.66
3. Diversification
A third advantage that corporations have is that they are able to narrowly tailor
altruism delivery to the specific idiosyncratic preferences of individuals in ways that the
government cannot. The government is limited by the political compromises of the
entire electorate, meaning contributions to the public good will be made only in cases of
broad political consensus or to serve particularly powerful political interest groups. In
contrast, different firms, just like different non-profits, can offer individual employees,
customers, and investors the opportunity to purchase different kinds of altruism.
Environmentally conscious individuals can choose to work for, invest in, or buy from
firms committed to sacrificing profits to help the environment, while those interested in
delivering medicines to the Third World or improving schools in local communities can
engage with firms that make those commitments. Dozens of for-profit firms have made
public commitments for each of these causes, and there are nearly as many social causes
as there are firms. An individual can satisfy almost any altruistic preference through forprofit firms because of the large number of firms, and because, like for consumer
products and services, firms compete by offering differentiated types of altruism
opportunities.
This last point is worth emphasizing. Just as in normal product markets where
firms try to offer differentiated products in the hope of getting market share and thus
profits, so too do firms offer differentiated altruism opportunities so as to maximize the
value the firm can deliver to its stakeholders. If every firm donated to or did work to
improve the environment, other charitable causes would suffer, and the benefits (be
they goodwill, warm glow for managers, or altruism utility for customers, shareholders,
and employees) from a firm choosing another cause would increase. This is analogous to
the concept of supply and demand curves in normal product markets.
The astute reader will ask: might not the consumer land in the region above U on C* but to the
left of yC, a segment we have labeled “less y.” Although this would decrease the altruistic efficiency of
bundling, it is very unlikely to happen because of the nature of public goods. Matthew Kotchen’s work on
“green markets” shows that an important feature of free riding is that the larger an economy is, the more
free riding on public goods there will be. Matthew J. Kotchen, Green Markets and Private Provision of
Public Goods, 114 J. POL. ECON. 816, 826-827 (2006). In other words, there will be less yC purchased by
each individual. In the extreme, yC will fall to zero, and thus bundling that raises the budget constraint to
C* can only increase the consumer’s expenditure of the altruistic public good y. But this is a rather
technical point that does nothing more than preserve the main argument from all but the most
improbable circumstances.
66 See Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office Shareholder Welfare
and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Firm, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1203-04
(1999) (“Shareholders would prefer to give at the office precisely because giving through the firm forces all
others who will also benefit from giving at the office too.”).
65
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This responsiveness to the demand signals from the market is important not only
in what is offered but also in what is not offered. Political programs, like Medicare or
farm subsidies, are notoriously sticky – once a political consensus on a particular public
good is achieved, it is difficult to do away with the program. Firms, which face constant
competition, are likely to be agile in offering stakeholders the particular altruism outlets
that they demand at a particular time. Philanthropy that increases stakeholder utility
will be offered, and that which does not will soon disappear.
A final observation on this point is that we should expect firms to deliver altruism
in areas or at times when they have some comparative advantage over other firms. As
noted above, Starbucks clearly has the distribution channels to help poor farmers in
coffee-growing countries, while Toyota naturally is connected with the environment. It
is possible that the employees of the outdoor clothing firm Patagonia would get utility
from the firm doing good for persecuted Christians in the Sudan, but it is much more
likely that their utility is linked more closely with the environment. Here then is a
cautionary tale for corporate watchdogs: corporate philanthropy is more suspect where
firm efforts to help others are not correlated with an obvious comparative advantage or
the logical preferences of firm stakeholders.
Although this discussion is focused mostly on how firms are advantaged vis-à-vis
the government, firms may also have an important role here compared with non-profits.
Although there are many non-profits and thus a diverse array of altruism opportunities,
non-profits offer only opportunities for donations (of cash or in kind) and volunteering.
Firms help complete the market for altruism by offering individuals who have altruistic
preferences other ways of satisfying them. For example, the transaction costs67 for some
individuals of volunteering or writing a check to a charity that helps Ethiopian farmers
may exceed the benefits. But these individuals may be willing to add $1 to each cup of
coffee to support these same farmers. Although rational individuals would be indifferent
between donating $200 via a check to a non-profit and buying 200 cups of fair trade
coffee, behavioral heuristics may make the former unappealing or less likely for some
individuals. The evidence discussed in Section V below about the tax treatment of the
purchase of products bundled with charitable contributions supports this – the
individual paying a $200 premium for fair trade coffee over the course of a year cannot
take a tax deduction for this contribution to charity, but may be able to if she gave a cash
donation for a charity to achieve the same end. Since the purchase of a product-charity
bundle is clearly inefficient for the individual from a monetary standpoint, there must
be other reasons that explain the choices of individuals. And it is satisfying the altruism
of these subrational individuals where firms provide an important component of the
market for altruism.68

We mean this in the Coasian sense – transaction costs includes any money, psychic, or other
cost that individuals experience when deciding on a course of action. One of these in this context might be
some notion of commodification and the belief that a donation is in some sense a bribe or payoff, while
paying a bit more for a product is not. We do not know what is in the minds of individuals making these
choices, but we observe behavior that is inconsistent with purely rational behavior. A full consideration of
the reasons is beyond the scope of this paper.
68 The same argument applies equally to working for or investing in firms committed to doing
good.
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4. Agency costs
A fourth, but more contestable, advantage that for-profit corporations have over
non-profit organizations and the government that they may be able to reduce agency
costs that are an inevitable part of giving through an intermediary. Individuals who
donate to non-profit charities suffer an agency problem: how to ensure the charity is
using donations to efficiently transfer value to beneficiaries? Perhaps charities are
spending too much on administrative expenses or are not providing the right sort of
value to beneficiaries, for example, sending poor African kids computers instead of food
or medicine.69 Corporations may be able to help. By aggregating a number of different
shareholders’ and consumers’ donations, they have greater leverage over charity
managers. They can use this leverage to demand disclosure of activities and
accountability. A useful analogy is to institutional investors, who are thought to
discipline a corporation’s managers on behalf of their own investors and, indirectly, the
individual shareholders of the corporation.70
Indeed, corporations may be better at directly providing the charitable products
that stakeholders demand than non-profits are at serving their donors because
corporations are more regulated and scrutinized than non-profits. Unlike for-profit
firms, non-profits are not subjected to intense scrutiny by investors, regulators,
plaintiff’s lawyers, academics, and activists in terms of governance and accountability.
In addition, federal securities laws and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which require enormous
transparency and impose strict liability and large penalties for non-compliance, do not
apply to non-profits.71 The result of less legal and market oversight is plain. There is
widespread criticism about the accountability of non-profits to donors,72 and non-profits
are widely regarded as much less well governed and subject to much less oversight than
the average public company.73 There are some third party organizations that provide
information for donors about non-profit governance and conduct,74 but these pale in
69 See, for example, Eric Posner, “The Strange Case of One Laptop Per Child,” University of
Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Jan. 7, 2008, available at
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/01/the-strange-cas.html.
70 See, for example, Theodor Baums, ed., Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance
(1993).
71 See, for example, http://www.ncna.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=429; see
also Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit
Accountability, 38 UC Davis Law Review 205 (2004); Bill Birchard, “Nonprofits by the Numbers: In the
Wake of Embarrassing Revelations, High-profile Scandals, and Sarbanes-Oxley, Nonprofit CFOs are
Striving for Greater Transparency and Accountability,” CFO MAGAZINE, Jul. 1, 2005, available at
http://careers.cfo.com/article.cfm/4124836.
72 See, for example, Ron Dixon, Bottom Line for (RED), NY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008 (noting that
detractors “criticize a lack of transparency at the company and its partners over how much they make
from Red products” and noting that “Red companies had collectively spent as much as $100 million in
advertising and raised only $18 million.”).
73 See, for example, Janet Greenlee, et al., An Investigation of Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations:
Occurrences and Deterrents, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUART. 676, 677 (2007) (estimating
total fraud at about 13% of all donations).
74 See, for example, www.charitynavigator.com (listing, inter alia, “ten charities drowning in
administrative costs” and rating financial health of over 5000 charities); www.charitywatch.org (reporting
results from American Institute of Philanthropy in evaluating charities based on fundraising efficiency);
William P. Barrett, “Genuinely Needy,” FORBES, Dec. 8, 2003 (describing annual survey of 200 large
charities), available at http://www.forbes.com/maserati/246.html.
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comparison with the investors, analysts, watchdogs, and government agencies
monitoring every move made by large, for-profit firms. All else being equal, an
individual might believe a for-profit firm is a better monitor, that is, has lower agency
costs, in a giving transaction.
Given well known examples of fraud by corporate managers (think Enron,
WorldCom and Tyco), we freely admit that our claim about agency costs is debatable. At
best corporations merely replace agency problems between a donor and a non-profit (or
taxpayers and politicians) with agency problems between a shareholder-donor and the
corporation’s managers. In a well-governed corporation, the corporation may have a leg
up on direct contributions to a non-profit or tax paid to the government. But in other
cases, a donor should take her chances with the non-profit and the tax payer should
prefer the government. What’s more, the non-profit and the government offer the
altruist a backstop – the non-profit cannot distribute profits to its managers and
politicians cannot skim off tax revenues – that limits the amount of misfeasance in
which they can engage. Our point is only that the well-governed for-profit corporation
may, in some cases, be more responsive to stakeholder’s altruistic desires than nonprofits are to donors and the government is to taxpayers.
5. Network Effects
A final corporate delivery benefit is the ability of firms to use their greater size to
more efficiently produce network effects in warm glow. What do we mean by “network
effects”? Simply that warm glow rises in either the number of other contributors or the
amount donated to a particular social cause.75 In economics, this is known as a network
externality. A classic example of a network externality is e-mail—the more people that
use e-mail, the more potential value the service may have to any individual user.
Moreover, the addition of any new user provides a benefit (that is, a positive externality)
to existing users. We argue the same effect exists in the market for altruism. An
individual’s $1 donation to a project to which another person also donates $1 gives more
than $1 of warm glow to each giver. And, like in e-mail, the addition of another $1 by
someone else after the original donation may provide some warm glow (as well as pure
altruism) to original donors. This is because a small donation alone can do very limited
good, but when an individual’s $1 is added to many other donations, the amount of pure
public good the $1 can do, and therefore the amount of warm glow it can deliver, is
higher.76
Our suggestion warm glow production generates network externalities is supported by some
empirical evidence. Studies examining the effect of matching contributions on giving by donors show
donors give more to charity when told their donation will be matched by their employer or some other
donor. See, for example, John A. List & Daniel Rondeau, “Matching and Challenge Gifts to Charity:
Evidence from Laboratory and Natural Field Experiments,” NBER Working Paper No. W13728 (2008)
(“We observe that a challenge gift attracted 23 percent more donors and increased total dollar
contributions 18 percent when compared to the identical campaign in which no announcement of
leadership gift was made.”). If a donor did not obtain some warm glow from the matching contribution, it
should have no effect on the donor’s contribution. In fact, if the donor had purely altruistic preferences,
the matching contribution might actually lower her own donation, because she can free ride on the public
benefits it provides.
76 This positive externality in warm glow may justify subsidies to encourage delivery in this
aggregated way.
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There are two implications of network effects in warm glow. The first is warm
glow may be even more effective at offsetting free riding than previously thought. When
there are economies of scale in the production of a good, this encourages higher levels of
production of that good. The economies of scale we highlight in the production of warm
glow means there will be incentives to produce more of it. Because a by-product of the
delivery of warm glow is the production of pure altruism, a second implication is there is
a return to agglomeration in the production of warm glow and thus altruism generally.
Agglomeration is possible in all three sectors, but there may be advantages that
corporations, which are generally much larger than non-profits, have in performing this
function.
Corporations may be better able to take advantage of scale than non-profit firms
because they are generally larger than non-profits. The size difference may be due, in
part, to the fact that non-profit firms rarely merge. There is little reward for increasing
the efficiency of a non-profit since the managers cannot share in the income from those
efficiencies. Moreover, non-profit entrepreneurs may be driven to directly control the
good works of the organization—just another form of warm glow—but this desire for
control also may discourage mergers.
Ostensibly the U.S. government, which is bigger than any one corporation, has
likewise an advantage over any for-profit firm at capitalizing on network externalities in
warm glow. Another feature of warm glow, however, limits the efficiencies of
government provision of altruism. James Andreoni, who popularized the idea of warm
glow, has demonstrated that warm glow declines in the number of beneficiaries that
share a contribution.77 More precisely, the warm glow from a contribution to a fund that
benefits N persons is greater than the warm glow from that contribution when the fund
benefits N+1 persons. Because contributions to the government (that is, taxes) are
shared by all beneficiaries of government public good programs, this diminishes the
network efficiencies of warm glow. In contrast, a corporation can target its social action
towards a smaller group of beneficiaries, thereby capturing the signal amplification of
warm glow in giving without reducing it by dispersing the impact across many
recipients. In other words, there are increasing returns to a larger fund but negative
returns to a larger number of beneficiaries. The government has a larger fund than any
corporation (and all corporations in the aggregate) but it cannot limit the number of
beneficiaries. Thus in many cases a corporation—especially a large one—may have a
comparative advantage over the government at delivering warm glow.
V. The Merits of Corporate Philanthropy
Having proposed a new framework for understanding corporate philanthropy, and
its relationship to the non-profit sector and government programs, it is time to return to
the basic questions that motivate this paper: should corporations engage in
philanthropy and how should the government regulate this activity?
A. Should Corporations Engage in Philanthropy?

See James Andreoni, Gifts to Groups: How Altruism Depends on the Number of Recipients, 91
J. PUB. ECON. 1731 (2007).
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Business schools teach its students – the future leaders of for-profit corporations
– that companies should only enter a market if they have an edge over their competitors.
Otherwise they will sacrifice their bottom line and perhaps fail. Given that the central
theme of this paper is that there is a market for altruism like there is for other products,
the same lesson applies to altruism.
To whit: Corporations should only engage in philanthropy if they have a cost or
quality advantage over other competitors in that market. This includes other
corporations and over non-profits and the government. Of course it is a little
complicated to determine how competitive the government is. After all, contributions to
government production are mandatory, so people (and corporations) do not have much
of a choice over whether to purchase government altruism.78 So the more nuanced
version of our claim is that a corporation should engage in a particular philanthropic
activity only if demand for that activity is not already satisfied by the government and if
the corporation is better able to perform that activity than both other corporations and
non-profits.
Although the debate over the merits of corporate philanthropy does tackle social
work by non-profits or the government, our framework has normative implications for
these actors as well. A non-profit should only engage in a specific philanthropic activity
if it is not crowded out by the government and it has a comparative advantage over other
non-profits and for-profit corporations. The government should only engage in a
specific altruistic activity if that activity is subject to free riding and is therefore likely to
be undersupplied by corporations and non-profits. (This is just a variant of the typical
economist’s claim that the proper, narrow role of government is to provide public
goods.) Of course, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government action.
If the government’s cost of addressing the undersupply is greater than consumer surplus
from that additional supply, then the government should remain on the sidelines.
B. How Should the Government Regulate Corporate Philanthropy?
The market for altruism is distinguished by competition across three sectors of
the economy. Since one of the sectors is the government, there is the risk not only that
the government will regulate the market for altruism to favor itself, but that it will not
treat each of its competitors equally. The main area of concern is regulation through tax
policy. The following examples illustrate our point.
Donations versus purchases. If a person wants to “buy” altruism via
donation to a non-profit and she itemizes her deductions, her purchase may be
deductible from her taxable income. This means that she effectively gets a price discount
on altruism equal to her marginal income tax rate. If the same person wants to “buy”
altruism by purchasing a so-called “green good” from a for-profit corporation, her
purchase is not tax deductible and thus no price discount.79 This discrepancy implies

This “crowd-out” of private altruism by government altruism is offset to some extent by a
“reverse crowd-out” effect since some – but not all – philanthropic activities are tax deductible and thus
reduce government revenues. Plus corporations – unlike §501(c)(3) non-profits – can lobby the
government to stop engaging in altruistic activities that compete with corporate philanthropy.
79 It should be noted that the costs from self-production of altruism, e.g., giving change to
homeless person, cannot be deducted from taxable income and thus, also, not privileged with a discount.
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that, even if green goods provide a more efficient form of altruism than traditional nonprofit activity, consumers may still donate to the non-profit.
Donations versus ownership. If a person wants to donate assets to a nonprofit, there are two options. If a person itemizes her deductions, she can donate cash
and deduct it from her income. This provides a price discount equal to her income tax
rate.80 If the person “buys” altruism, however, by owning shares in a corporation that
sacrifices some shareholder profits to engage in philanthropy, the person would draw
two benefits. First, the corporation is permitted to deduct the philanthropic expenses as
either contributions to a non-profit charity or a business expense, lowering its corporate
income tax bill. Second, the person would lose some corporate profit which would
reduce her capital gains tax bill81 (if she sold appreciated stock) or her personal income
tax bill (if the corporation issued dividends). The net effect is that altruism purchased
via share ownership affords a price discount that includes the corporate income tax rate
and the capital gains rate. Thus the discount from donating cash to a non-profit is the
personal income tax rate while the discount from owning shares in a for-profit is a
combination of the corporate income tax rate and the capital gains rate. Typically the
latter combination is greater than the personal income tax rate, so tax policy favors
corporate philanthropy over donations to a non-profit.82
These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. Table 1 summarizes the disparate
treatment tax treatment of altruistic purchases from the different sectors. (The specific
rates are derived in Appendix B.) It highlights not just disparate treatment across
sectors but also disparate treatment of different methods of purchasing altruism within
a sector and disparate treatment across people for a given purchase of altruism. For
example, itemizers get to deduct cash donations to non-profits but (usually less wealthy)
non-itemizers do not. Thus, itemizers get a discount, but non-itemizers do not. Another
example is that volunteers who are paid an hourly wage likely get a discount equal to
their personal income tax rate, while volunteers who are salaried do not. The reason is
that the reduction is work hours due to volunteering lowers the income and thus tax bill
of hourly workers, but not salaried workers.

80 Alternatively, she can donate an appreciated asset, deduct not only the full value of the asset
from her taxable income, but also avoid paying capital gains tax on the appreciation. (To see the capital
gains benefit, imagine the person sold the stock and donated cash instead of the stock. She would have to
pay capital gains tax on the appreciation.)
81 This assumes that the individual would have shared in corporate profits by selling her shares. If
the corporation instead issued dividends (which are taxed as ordinary labor income), the philanthropic
activity would reduce her personal income tax bill.
82 Of course, the conclusion may be reversed if the person donates appreciated stock. See supra
note 80. It may be reversed back if the corporation distributed all its profits via dividends. See supra note
81.
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Table 1. Tax treatment of altruism purchased in non-profit and for-profit
sectors
Sector

Non-profit

Method of purchase
Donating cash
Donating appreciated
stock

Discount for typical consumer
tp if itemizer (0 otherwise)
tp plus a rebate equal to appreciation times tcg

0 (tp if volunteering reduces hours worked and
earnings)
Working
tp
Owning shares
tc(1 – tcg) + tcg
For-profit Buying green product
0
Working
tp
Notes. tp is the personal income tax rate, tcg is the capital gains tax rate, and tc is the
corporate income tax rate.
Donating time

Before one can address any of these forms of discrimination, one must decide
how much one wants to subsidize altruism. For example, if the right subsidy is the
personal income tax rate (tp), then we should try to increase the discount for buying
green goods by making those purchases tax deductible and perhaps decrease the
discount for owning shares by eliminating the corporate tax (tc). Alternatively, if the
right subsidy is zero, then the appropriate strategy is to eliminate any tax deductions for
contributions of cash or stock to a non-profit. We do not take a position on which level
of subsidy is appropriate – that is outside the scope of this paper. Our particular claim is
that whatever the level of subsidy, the government should provide it as uniformly as
possible across (and within) sectors and people.
There are two caveats to our contention that the government should eliminate tax
discrimination between producers of altruism. The first is that eliminating tax
discrimination is costly.83 For instance, giving a tax break for the altruistic component of
a green good requires that the government estimate the altruistic component of that
good. That is, the government must determine, say, how much more Starbucks pays
farmers for fair trade coffee than for regular coffee or how much of the additional cost of
a hybrid car is attributable to its ability to lower greenhouse gases. Perhaps the
government could rely on corporations to self-report these costs. But because even
philanthropic corporations care about profits, they have an incentive to exaggerate the
“green” portion of green goods. After all, doing so lowers the effective price of those
good to consumers and increases philanthropic corporations’ profits. Of course the
government already relies on self-reporting of costs and expenses for most of its tax
A related point is that eliminating discrimination sometimes has collateral consequences. For
example, addressing the disparate treatment of owning shares in a philanthropic corporation and
donating cash to a non-profit requires abolishing the corporate income tax. If there are benefits to that tax
outside the market for altruism, then eliminating this form of discrimination will have as an unintended
consequence the loss of those benefits. Therefore, we must insert the following condition to our argument
against tax discrimination in the market for altruism: if cost of eliminating tax break is greater than the
inefficiency from the tax discrimination, we should leave the discrimination in place.
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collection. Instead of checking each return, checks a handful and punishes violators with
heavy fines.84 It could do the same with respect to self-reporting of the costs from green
goods.
The second caveat to our position against discriminatory tax treatment of
altruistic producers is that some discrimination cannot be eliminated. For example, so
long as there is a capital gains tax or personal income tax, one cannot eliminate some
benefit to purchasing altruism by owing stock in a philanthropic corporation. Whenever
that corporation sacrifices shareholder profits to engage in philanthropy, the
shareholder will lower either capitals gains or dividends, which will lower her tax bill. Of
course, the inability to eliminate all discrimination is not a persuasive argument against
trying to eliminate any discrimination. Otherwise perfection will become the enemy of
progress.
General statements about the evils of discrimination are fine, but specific
suggestions are more helpful. So what would we recommend? Assuming that the
optimal price discount for altruism is the personal income tax rate, we have three
proposals.85 First, the government should allow all consumers to deduction the
charitable component of the green goods they purchase. Producers of green goods
should estimate that component for the government and provide consumers with a
separate receipt for that component. This is exactly what non-profits currently do for
donors of non-cash assets. Second, the government should allow all consumers to
deduct donations of cash or assets to non-profit organizations. These deductions should
not be restricted to itemizers. In other words, all contributions to non-profit charities
should be privileged with an above-the-line deduction. Third, the government should
tax donations of stock and other appreciated assets the same as donations of cash to
non-profits. There are two ways to accomplish this: do not exempt appreciation of
donated stock from capital gains taxes or only permit donors a charitable deduction
from labor income equal to their basis in the donated stock.86 (The latter reform works
by encouraging donors to sell stock and donate the proceeds, after paying capital gains
taxes, as cash.)

The government also requires accounting firms to sign off on corporate income tax returns and
holds those accounting firms liable if the corporate returns are inaccurate. This incentivizes accounting
firms to police corporations. The same could be done with green goods.
85 It should be noted that some components of the plans below have previously been proposed by
scholars and policy advocates. Joseph Cordes, et al, “Extending the Charitable Deduction to Nonitemizers:
Policy Issues and Options,” URBAN INSTITUTE, CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY SERIES, No. 7 (May 2000) (arguing
for above-the-line deduction for all charitable contributions); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution
of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002) (find no
persuasive argument for permitting deduction of fair market value of appreciated stock); see also, Joint
Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 293, JCS02-05 (Jan. 27, 2005). There are other, more normative proposals, that we do not consider. See, for
example, Andrew Chamberlain & Mark Sussman, Charities and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming
the Federal Income Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts, TAX FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT No. 137 (Nov.
2005) (advocating the denial of a deduction for donations to charities that do not in fact contribute to the
public good). The full set of reforms, however, has not been proposed before. The reason is that previous
scholarship has not grasped the breadth of the market for altruism, seen the full range of inequalities, and
thus sought to pursue true tax neutrality.
86 Dan Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Builtin Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2002).
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Conclusion
Individuals have preferences for altruism, and they can turn to three providers in
what call the “market for altruism” to satisfy these preferences. Non-profit charities and
the government are the typical intermediaries that help individuals satisfy these
preferences, whether individuals are seeking pure altruism, warm glow, or some mix of
both. For-profit corporations have historically provided cash donations to charities, but
their role is increasingly to do good works to help others themselves. This new and bigger
role has been criticized and praised, but neither backers nor skeptics have properly
framed the debate. Corporations aren’t increasingly acting charitably simply because it
increases profits (good) or because managers are acting selfishly (bad), but rather
because their stakeholders—investors, employees, and customers—are demanding that
they do.
The market for altruism we define is not like other markets. For one, the
government is both a player and a rule setter in this market, which means that there may
be crowding out of private production and unfair competition across sectors depending
on tax and other regulatory policies. The market also has suffers the classic problem of
free-riding on public goods—that for-profit firms may be uniquely positioned to solve
through bundling of altruistic goods with non-altruistic goods. We show how firms may
also have other comparative advantages that allow them in some cases to more efficiently
deliver altruistic goods than either non-profit charities or the government. In other
cases, these other competitors may be better suited for this job.
With no clear theoretical basis for choosing the most efficient competitor for
delivering altruism, we should expect neutral tax treatment so as not to bias altruism
purchasing decisions based on taxes. We show not only is the tax law not neutral among
competitors (not to mention other potential laws and regulations that may introduce
non-efficiency based biases), but the current tax laws are incoherent. Certain
mechanisms for giving within a sector are favored over other mechanisms without any
clear efficiency basis for this distinction. For example, donations of appreciated stock or
ownership of shares in philanthropic corporations are the most tax favored, while
separate rules exist for donations of money and time to non-profits, pro bono work, and,
most importantly, products bundled with charity and sold by corporations. . Seeing no
justification for this, we offer several reform proposals with an eye toward leveling the
competitive playing field and setting the right incentives for the production of altruism in
the economy.
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Appendix A
In order to understand the magnitude of the market for altruism and the manner
in which the various sectors (the government, non-profits, and for-profits) compete
through different delivery mechanisms (donations, investments, labor, and purchases),
we provide an examination of the inputs and outputs of this market.
1. Inputs
i. For-profit Sector
There are three primary stakeholders in any firm: investors, employees, and
customers. Individuals, whether they are contributing capital, helping turn the capital
into goods and services, or buying goods and services from firms, may be willing to “pay”
firms to do good on their behalf. This intermediary role for the firm is analogous to that
served by non-profit charities, which solicit donations from individuals to do good on
their behalf. We consider the inputs provided by each of these constituencies in turn. As
we show, a rough estimate of the total inputs to corporate social action is several
hundred billion dollars.
Investors. There is some evidence that shareholders are willing to forgo profits by
investing in firms that are committed to acting in a socially responsible fashion. An
entire industry, known as socially responsible investing (SRI), has developed to identify
and invest in firms acting in socially and environmentally responsible ways.87 There are
over 500 mutual funds and other institutional investors focusing entirely on this type of
investing.88 The major stock exchanges also have special indices, like the FTSE 4Good
Index and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, which track the performance of these
firms.89
The amount of investment in firms committed to relatively more social welfare
than the average firm is staggering. In 2005, over $2.3 trillion was invested in socially
responsible investment funds, which is about 10 percent of total assets under
management in the United States.90 Because the filtering process screens out potentially
profitable investments, investors in these funds necessarily forsake potential profits.
These opportunity costs are in effect a charitable contribution by the investors to social
welfare. In a recent analysis, Christopher Geczy, Robert Stambauh, and David Levin find
investments in socially screened funds underperform alternative investments in
SRI primarily involves applying ethical screens to personal and institutional investments to
ensure that funds are directed toward sustainable activities and away from unsustainable ones. Funds can
use “negative” screens, meaning that they prohibit investment in companies or funds involved in specific
activities such as tobacco production or nuclear power. “Positive” screens, a more recent SRI tool,
encourage investments in companies that generate economic activity consistent with sustainability, such
as solar power or microfinance.
88 See Social Investment Forum, available at http://www.socialinvest.org/.
89
See, for example, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp;
http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/.
90 See Social Investment Forum, available at http://www.socialinvest.org/. Of this, about $180
billion is in socially responsible mutual funds, while the remainder is individually managed accounts of
individuals or institutions. See id.
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unscreened firms by 35 basis points.91 In other words, investors in these funds contribute
about $85 billion per year ($2.4 trillion times 3.5 percent) to social welfare by limiting
their investments to funds committed to doing good (or not doing bad).
If we are correct that shareholders get utility (in the form of altruism) from the
firms they invest in doing social good, then this $85 billion figure surely underestimates
the total amount of this form of giving. This estimate includes only a small and very
specific subset of investments in public firms, and thereby excludes other types of
investments and investments in small or private firms. In addition, socially responsible
investing is growing dramatically, rising over 300 percent over the past decade.92 If
recent history is a gauge, this is true even in times when overall investment in equity
markets declines. For example, according to Lipper, in the first quarter of 2003 investors
added nearly $200 billion to socially responsible mutual funds, while regular mutual
funds experienced a net decrease of over $13 billion.93 Over 50 percent of Fortune 500
firms provide social responsibility reports, and hardly a week goes by without some
company announcing what it is doing for the world’s environment. Adding this all
together, we estimate that shareholders “contribute” at least $100 billion per year in
forgone capital appreciation by investing in socially responsible firms.94
Employees. Just as investors can forgo equity returns in return for altruism, so
too can a firm’s workers contribute to social good by accepting a lower wage from a firm
committed to social action. If the market clearing wage for an store manager is $100, but
an environmentally conscious one agrees to work for a firm like Patagonia for, say, $80,
then the $20 difference is equivalent to a donation to charity. In other words, all else
being equal, the individual store manager would be indifferent between working for
Sears and donating some portion of her salary to an environmental charity, and working
for Patagonia.
The empirical evidence supports a claim employees are willing to give up financial
compensation in return for working for a firm committed to social action. David
Montgomery and Catherine Ramus surveyed about 300 MBAs and used conjoint
analysis to estimate their willingness to forgo financial benefits for a variety of firm
See Christopher Geczy, et al., “Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds” Wharton
Working Paper (2005), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=416380. This finding is consistent
with the views of industry experts. A study by the consultancy Mercer finds that investors recognize that
“SRI could reduce returns and increase risk” as well as be “costly in terms of money and staff time.”
http://www.mercer.com/summary.jhtml?idContent=1207675.
92 See “Socially Responsible Investing Grows Rapidly,” WorldWatch Institute, available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5481.
93 DAVID CROWTHER & LEZ RAYMAN-BACCHUS, PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
163 (2004).
94 See also Hart Dowell, et al., Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy
Market Value, 4 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1059, 1065 (2000) (finding that polluting reduces stock price); see also
A. King & M. Lenox, Does it Really Pay to be Green? Accounting for Strategy Selection in the Relationship
between Environmental and Financial Performance, 4 J. of Industrial Ecology 4 (2001) (analyzing 652
manufacturing firms over the time period 1987–1996, and finding a relationship between low pollution
and higher valuation); S. Konar & M.A. Cohen, Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?, 83
REV. ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, 281 (2001); J.T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market
Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENV. ECON. MANAGEMENT 98, 106 (1995) (finding
listing on EPA toxic release inventory reduces stock price 9.7 percent). For a comprehensive list of studies
on this subject, see International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Bibliography
of Sources Discussing Benefits and Costs of Environmental Enforcement, Compliance, and Performance
http://www.inece.org/links_pages/onlineresourcesCost.html.
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characteristics.95 They find employees willing to give up about 8 percent of their expected
total compensation to work for firms committed to environmental sustainability and
caring for stakeholders.96 This amounts to an implicit donation of nearly $10,000 per
employee per year.97
A reasonable analogy can be made to volunteering. When an individual
volunteers, they show a willingness to forgo financial benefits equal to the difference
between the wage for the particular task and zero. These forgone dollars are their
donation to charity. As discussed below, individuals forgo about $200 billion in wages by
donating time to non-profit charities. Since this figure is calculated using a very low
wage—about $15 per hour—and most volunteers are very high wage earners, this
estimate approximates the wage discount found by Montgomery and Ramus. (In fact, the
total value of the volunteering is about $2000 per year per person, which is only onefifth of what the MBA survey suggests is the willingness to pay for some employees.) It is
not unreasonable to suggest that employees at firms donate a comparable amount of
labor to firms by accepting wages below those of the market-clearing price to work at
firms committed to doing good. If a significant number of employees have the same
willingness to pay as those in the MBA survey, then this implicit donation could be quite
large. For example, if only 1 percent of employees took a wage discount as large as that
suggested by this research, the total donation to charity from this behavior would be
about $10 billion.98
Customers. One need only look at the grocery store shelves or visit a local coffee
shop to see the manner in which customers donate through firms for the purpose of
social action. Firms are increasingly offering so-called “green” products for sale at a
premium price. These are ordinary items that are manufactured, distributed, used, or
disposed of in a way that is more socially sensitive than the regular version of the same
product.99 Fair-trade coffee, biodegradable household cleaners, and hybrid cars are
examples. According to one independent market analyst group, about 10 percent of all
new product introductions are green products.100 Another survey finds that about 30
percent of consumers consider whether the firm is “doing good” as key factor in
purchasing decisions.101
These products are nothing more than a bundle of two separate goods—a regular
good and donation to charity or to improve social welfare. To see this, consider fair-trade
95 See David B. Montgomery & Catherine A. Ramus, “Corporate Social Responsibility Reputation
Effects on MBA Job Choice,” Stanford Research Paper No. 1805 (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412124.
96 See id. at 6.
97 See id. (finding MBAs willing to give up $5500 to work for firms committed to environmental
sustainability and $3700 to work for firms committed to other stakeholders, based on an expected
compensation packages of $115,000). A 2004 survey of 800 MBAs in North America found that 97
percent would be willing to give up an average 14 percent of pay to work for socially responsible firms. See
Institute for Global Ethics Newsletter, Aug. 2, 2004, available at www.globalethics.org.
98 This estimate is probably conservative. According to the Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey, about 10 percent of the workforce has a “graduate or professional degree.” See American
Community Survey 2004, available at www.censusbureau.biz/acs/www.
99 In our usage, a “green” product may help social causes other than the environment.
100 See Matthew J. Kotchen, Green Markets and Private Provisions of Public Goods, 114 J. POL.
ECON. 816, 817 (2006) (citing study by Marketing Intelligence Service).
101 See Dale Kurchiner, “5 Ways Ethical Business Creates Fatter Profits,” BUS. ETHICS 21,
Mar./Apr. 1996.
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coffee. Starbucks pays Ethiopian farmers significantly more than the going wage for
coffee beans and charges a premium price, for example, selling regular Ethiopian coffee
for $10 and fair-trade Ethiopian coffee for $15. The extra $5 is just a “donation” to help
the Ethiopian farmers, administered through Starbucks instead of a non-profit charity.
The market for fair-trade products exceeds $1.5 billion, and is growing
dramatically—estimates are that it will exceed $15 billion by 2012.102 This is just a
fraction of the overall value of goods and services provided by firms that bundle some
sort of social welfare improvement with a regular product.103 Some of these products
explicitly bundle donations. Examples include the (RED) campaign in which various
firms committed to donate a portion of sales to treat AIDS in Africa.104 Other products
implicitly bundle a donation. Examples include “green” household products and paper
products made from recycled materials. One estimate puts the value of all goods and
services embedding a commitment to sustainability at around $200 billion.105
There are innumerable examples of recently introduced and widely popular
products embedding social action. The Toyota Prius is a prominent example. The Prius
(and all hybrids for that matter) are marketed as being good for the environment because
of reduced fuel consumption over a given distance. Toyota has sold over 500,000 Prius
vehicles in the United States over the past few years, each at a premium of about $4000
to $7000 over a comparably equipped vehicle.106 Some part of this premium is the
equivalent of a donation to an environmental charity. (Admittedly there is also a purely
private consumption part: the expected cost savings in terms of fuel.) If we assume about
half of the premium is environmentally motivated (a conservative assessment perhaps
given the way these cars are marketed), Prius owners alone have donated the equivalent
of about $2 billion to environmental sustainability.
ii. Non-profit Sector
The inputs to non-profit charities are more familiar. Individuals hoping to do
good and feel good about doing it can opt to donate cash or time to non-profit charities
committed to doing good. There are therefore three inputs—donations, volunteering, and
working—and they amount to more than $600 billion per year.

102 See Michael J. Hiscox, “Fair Trade as an Approach to Managing Globalization,” Memo
prepared for the conference on Europe and the Management of Globalization, Princeton University,
February 23, 2007, available at
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:YRAvWRFqGY8J:www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Hiscox_Fair
percent2520Trade percent2520 and percent2520Globalization.pdf+market+size+ percent22fair+trade
percent22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=36&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
103 The (RED) campaign has raised about $60 million raised for charity. See Ron Dixon, Bottom
Line for (RED), NY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008. The lack of transparency about how the funds are raised, how
much is spent on advertising, and so on has raised concerns about the campaign. See id. As we discuss
below in Part III, this is not unique to the (RED) campaign.
104 See id.
105
See Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability (LOHAS) market, available at
http://www.lohas.com/about.html.
106 See Jerry Garrett, Pick of the litter: Which hybrids are hot? Which are not?, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, May 20, 2006 (describing how Toyota is considering adding Prius premium to other hybrids);
see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toyota_Prius (describing over 500,000 Prius cars sold in United
States).
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Donations. Total cash contributions to non-profits were about $295 billion in
About 75 percent of this was direct donations by individuals, with the remaining
coming from bequests, donations by corporations and foundations.108 Total
contributions have grown at a rate of about 9 percent per year for the past 15 years.109 As
we discuss below, cash donations to charities are tax privileged, since they can be
deducted from total taxable income.
Volunteering. The estimates of volunteer time vary. According to one study, in
2006, about 62 million Americans volunteered for non-profit charities. The average
volunteer donated about 130 hours, meaning a total of over 8 billion hours of free labor
was provided to non-profit charities. Each of these hours was unpaid, meaning the
difference between the wage rate for the task performed and zero (the amount paid for
the work) was a donation to social good. According to the non-profit trade group the
Independent Sector, the estimated average value of this time (and thus donation) is
about $19 per hour.110 The total value of this input is therefore over $150 billion. Another
estimate puts the number of volunteer hours at over 15 billion, implying a donation of
almost $240 billion.111
Working. Just as individuals may work at a discount for for-profit firms
committed to doing good, employees of non-profits may demand less in wages because
they work for non-profit charities. We are not aware of any attempts to quantify the size
of this donation to social good. To estimate it, we would want to know the difference
between what individuals are paid to perform similar tasks for employers not committed
to doing good. If we assume the average employee of a non-profit is doing about what the
average employee of a for-profit is doing, we can then estimate the wage discount by
comparing the difference between the total percent of the labor force employed by nonprofits and the total percent of wages paid to non-profit employees. According to one
source, about 7.2 percent of all employees in the economy worked at non-profit charities,
while they earned only 6.6 percent of all wages.112 If this amount represents a wage
discount, as opposed to a lower human capital of these employees,113 it amounts to an
additional $30 billion contribution by non-profit employees.114
2006.107

See “U.S. Charitable Giving Reaches $295 Billion in 2006,” Giving USA, Press Release, June
25, 2007 (describing report Giving USA 2007).
108 About $23 billion in bequests; $13 billion in corporate donations; $37 billion in donations
from foundations (individual and corporate). See id.
109 See Giving USA 2005, SA-T562, available at http://www.aafrc.org/gusa/gusa_order.htm.
110 See http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/volunteer_time.html.
111 See Independent Sector, “Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001,” available at
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/gv01main.html (reporting 15.5 billion hours or
about 9 million full-time equivalents in 2001 survey).
112 Lester M. Salamon & S. Wojciech Sokolowski, “Employment in America’s Charities: A Profile,”
Nonprofit Employment Bulletin Number 26, Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Employment Data Project, Dec.
2006,
available
at
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:kZ6AwUM82sJ:www.jhu.edu/~ccss/research/pdf/Employment
percent2520in
percent2520Americas
percent2520Charities.pdf+2004+Center+policy+studies+non-profit+7.7
percent25&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
113 The non-profit literature reveals mixed results on the question of whether the lower wages
were the result of a wage discount or lower human capital. See, for example, Anne E. Preston, The
Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World, 7 J. Lab. Econ. 438, 446 (1989) (controlling for human capital
and other work variables, finds a negative wage differential of 20 percent); Femida Handy & Eliakim Katz,
The Wage Differential between Nonprofit Institutions and Corporations: Getting More by Paying Less?,
107
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iii. Government Sector
The government receives “contributions” in the form of taxes from individuals to
improve the social welfare by investing in public goods. These contributions are not
entirely voluntary, since paying taxes is mandatory and subject to financial and criminal
penalties. In 2006, the federal government collected about $2.4 trillion in taxes, which is
consistent with a historical trend of about 19 percent of gross domestic product.115 In
addition, state and local governments collected about $1.2 trillion in taxes.116 Not all of
these taxes are provided by individuals, and not all of those provided by individuals are
dedicated to providing social welfare in the sense of delivering altruism to individuals.
Social insurance (that is, Social Security, Medicare, etc.) might be viewed as the
government selling insurance to consumers, and therefore a private good of sorts. State
and local taxes are also more likely to be private goods, since these receipts are more
likely to go to things like fixing local potholes and maintaining local courts to enforce
contracts. So, roughly, if we take out social insurance and state and local taxes, the
government collects about $1.6 trillion in taxes.117 Not all of these tax revenues are used
to produce public goods or deliver altruism, be it warm glow or pure altruism. For
example, the United States Post Office is certainly not a public good, while the money
spent to defend the country and to clean up the environment certainly are. The best we
can do is put this figure of $1.6 trillion as an upper bound on the amount the government
collects to do charitable social good.
Working for the government may also be a contribution to the public good, just as
working for a firm or a non-profit can be. The government at all levels employed about
22 million people in 2006, or about 15 percent of all workers in the United States.118
Most of these government workers were employed at the state and local level (87 percent
of total). These workers are somewhat less likely to be involved in creating pure public
goods. The wage discount question is complicated with government workers. Some
government workers undoubtedly take a wage discount to work for the government, but
the tradeoffs may be for more leisure, better benefits, more responsibility, more job
security, and so on.119 In addition, it is not at all clear that the overall government wages
26 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 246, 251 (1998) (finding that lower wages are “adopted by nonprofits to
generate positive self-selection among its managerial staff”).
114 The median household wages in the United States in 2006 was about $48,000. The total
number of households were about 113 million. See Current Population Survey,
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/hhinc/new04_001.htm (Table HINC-04. Presence of Children
Under 18 Years old--Households, by Total Money Income in 2006,Type of Household, Race and Hispanic
Origin of Reference Person, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2007 Annual Social and
Economic Supplement, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/hhinc/new06_000.htm (Table HINC06. Income Distribution to $250,000 or More for Households, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement).
115 The U.S. GDP was about $13 trillion in 2006. See
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp.
116 See http://www.census.gov/govs/www/qtax.html.
117 See Office of Management and Budget Report (2006), SA/T461, available at _____.
118
See http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=228; see also, Office of
Management and Budget (2006) SA/T447, SA/T569).
119 For a comparison of the benefits, see
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/Careers/10/11/cb.government/index.html.
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are in fact less over a range of jobs. Comparing the national average wage and the
government wages for eleven randomly chosen job classifications, the government
salaries are on average 4 percent higher.120 This is certainly not conclusive evidence, but
this coupled with the arguably greater benefits that comes with government jobs,
suggests that the altruism contribution component is small or non-existent.
2. Outputs
Non-profit charities act directly to do social good, whether it is through feeding
the poor in soup kitchens or buying land to set aside from development. The largest
component by dollar volume is religious activity (36 percent), which likely includes a
variety of social services. Education (15 percent), human services (10 percent), and
health (9 percent) are the next largest activities of non-profit charities. The government
does direct social activities too, but it also acts as an intermediary and issues grants to
non-profits (about $95 billion in 2006), for them to do good. Judging from the
magnitude of inputs, the total amount of altruism generating activity from these two
sources likely exceeds $2 trillion.
The traditional accounts of corporate philanthropy focus on corporate donations
to activities by non-profit charities (about $20 billion in 2006). The largest component is
about $13 billion in direct gifts from firms to non-profit charities.121 The deductibility of
direct gifts is capped at 10 percent of taxable income, and the average firm gives between
1 and 2 percent of pre-tax profits.122 Some firms, like Patagonia and Whole Foods,
pledged a gift of up to 10 percent of profits to charity, but these are rare acts of
generosity.123
The rest of corporate giving is about $8 billion in grants from corporate
foundations.124 Five of the biggest ten foundations were established by operating
companies, most of which are pharmaceutical companies. Firms also donate billions to
charities and other non-profits in the form of employee matching grants.125 In absolute
terms, firm direct giving has increased three fold since 1970, but as a proportion of
profits has remained steady at about 1.5 percent.126

120 See http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/Careers/10/11/cb.government/index.html (noting average
wages for the following jobs: attorney, financial manager, economist, microbiologist, architect,
accountant, librarian, human resources manager, nurse, tax specialist, and medical technician).
121 See Giving USA, Giving USA 2006, available at http://www.aafrc.org/gusa/gusa_order.htm.
122 See Internal Revenue Code section 170(b)(2). Legislation proposed in 2003 would have raised
this to 20 percent gradually over the next several years. See
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/gr/hr7.html. See also Giving USA, Giving USA 2007,
available at http://www.aafrc.org/gusa/gusa_order.htm.
123 See http://www.patagonia.com/usa/patagonia.go?assetid=2927 (“at least 1 percent of sales or
10 percent of pre-tax profits – whichever is more”);
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/contact/community.html (“While the exact amount varies from year
to year, we are committed to giving at least five percent of our annual net profits to charitable causes.”).
124 See FC 2005, available at ____.
125 While we know of no data on the amount of employee matching programs, nearly every major
company has a very generous matching program. See, for example, General Electric Employee Matching
Program, Part IV.A.4 (matching up to $50,000 per employee per year), available at
http://www.ge.com/foundation/grant_initiatives/mg_guidelines.html.
126 Direct giving is up over three times since 1970.
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Focusing only on corporate donations, however, dramatically underestimates the
amount of good works, and therefore altruism, firms deliver. To see this, consider the
most obvious firm activity creating public goods: overcompliance with environmental
laws. Countless high-profile companies have committed to lower emissions of carbon
dioxide at the cost of several billion dollars,127 and experts estimate these costs are at
least $30 billion and rising dramatically.128 These costs are charitable contributions,
since they are voluntary expenditures intended to improve social welfare in ways not
obviously linked with shareholder value. After all, every dollar spent on reducing green
house gas emissions is intended to improve the global environment instead of earning
the most possible money for shareholders. A number of other corporate activities,
including overcompliance with health, safety, and product regulatory rules, also fall
within this category.129

127 Examples include: General Electric, see
http://www.gepower.com/corporate/ecomagination_home/ge_position_uscap.htm
(describing
commitment by General Electric); Coca-Cola, see Michelle Conlin, “From Plundered to Protector, BUS.
WEEK, Aug. 16, 2004 at 62 (describing plan to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals); Federal Express, see
Marc Gunther, “Tree Huggers, Soy Lovers, and Profits,” FORTUNE, June 23, 2003 at 99 (noting that FedEx
converted its entire fleet to hybrid vehicles); UPS, see id. (noting conversion of 18,000 vehicles to
alternative fuels); Motorola, see A. Revkin, “U.S. is Pressuring Industries to Cut Greenhouse Gas
Emissions,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A1; Alcoa, see id. (describing plan to cut by 25 percent); Waste
Management, see id.; Proctor & Gamble, see Roger Cowe, “Improving Quality of Life and Profits,” FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002 at 12 (noting commitment to reduce carbon emissions by two-thirds); DuPont, see
Carey, “Global Warming,” BUS. WEEK, Aug. 16, 2004 at 62 (describing 65 percent reduction in emissions
since 1990, and plan to cut by additional two thirds).
128 Interview conducted with experts on environmental law on January 10, 2008.
129 See, for example, Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2029 (2005) (showing that private contracts are frequently replacing or supplementing traditional
government oversight on environmental and other regulatory compliance issues).
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Appendix B
The following discussion derives the tax rates reported in Table 1.
1. Non-profit sector
The dominant method of purchasing altruism from charities is to donate cash or
other real assets.130 If a taxpayer already itemizes deductions, she can deduct her
donation from her taxable income. This deduction (called an “above-the-line”
deduction) amounts to a discount on the price of altruism equal to her personal income
tax rate. If the taxpayer does not itemize her deductions, however, the donation (called a
below-the-line deduction) will not actually reduce her taxable income and the donation
is not at all subsidized.131 Since only about 35 percent of taxpayers itemize their
deductions,132 most donors do not actually enjoy any tax break for their donations.
Itemizers are, however, responsible for a disproportionate share of donations, because
they have higher incomes and thus likely demand more altruism,133 and because higher
income earners pay a higher average tax rate and thus enjoy a larger price discount on
donations.
A second method of contributing to non-profit charities is to donate one’s time,
also known as volunteering. The tax treatment of volunteering depends on what an
individual would have done had she not volunteered her time. For hourly workers that
could choose to work an extra hour and earn additional wages, volunteering reduces
taxable income by the foregone wages. In that case, volunteering essentially offers the
taxpayer an above-the-line deduction, that is, a discount on the price of altruism equal
to the volunteer’s personal income tax rate. For salaried workers or those who would
choose leisure instead of volunteering, no income is forgone by volunteering, and
therefore there is no favorable tax treatment or discount on the price of altruism.
A third method of purchasing altruism from the non-profit sector is to donate
appreciated stock or other investment property. A taxpayer who donates, for example,
stock that has increased in value since its purchase does not have to pay any capital
gains tax on the appreciation and can deduct the full value of the stock as if it were a
130 We exclude volunteering and appreciated securities. These receive separate tax treatment and
are discussed below.
131 Donations are taxed differently if they are made at the time of an individual’s death. (Roughly
10 percent of contributions to charity are bequests. Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving
USA 2004: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2003 (2004); Congressional Budget Office,
The Estate Tax and Charitable Giving 1-2 (2004).) Like the treatment of donations (other than stock or
time) during an individual’s lifetime, donations at death are deductible from the taxable estate. Because
the estate tax schedule differs from the personal income tax schedule (for example the estate tax schedule
currently maxes out with a 48 percent tax bracket while the personal income tax schedule maxes out with
a 35 percent tax bracket), donations at death afford a different price discount.
132 IRS, Statistics of Income – Tax Stats, Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304
(Complete
Report),
Tables
1.2
and
2.1
(2005),
available
at:
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134951,00.html (checked Feb. 19, 2008) (reporting
that 47,775,427 of 134,372,678 filers itemized deductions).
133 Itemizers account for 80.5 percent of all income tax revenue raised in 2005. See id. (reporting
that itemizer paid $753 billion of the total $934 billion in income tax paid). Altruism is likely a “normal
good,” that is one for which demand increases as incomes rise.
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cash donation.134 This donation is more favorable than the donation of cash, regardless
of whether or not a taxpayer itemizes deductions. If the taxpayer does not itemize
deductions, then the appreciated stock donation reduces capital gains taxes. If the
taxpayer does itemize deductions, then the appreciated stock donations afford both the
deduction of a cash donation plus the capital gains tax break.
The final method of contributing to non-profits is to work as a paid employee of a
non-profit. Working can be thought of as a donation if the non-profit pays a lower-thanmarket wage for equivalent services. The size of the donation is the difference between
the market wage and the non-profit wage. Because this foregone income lowers taxable
income by the same amount, it generates a tax break equal to an above-the-line
deduction in the amount of the foregone income. The result is, again, a price discount on
altruism equal to the earner’s personal income tax rate.
2. The For-profit Sector
The tax treatment of altruism purchased from for-profit firms is much more
complex. One way for the taxpayer to obtain altruism through firms is to own shares in a
company that either donates to non-profits or directly engages in social action. Either
way, the purchase of altruism is deductible to the company as a charitable donation135 or
as a business expense. This gives the company a discount on the price of altruism equal
to its corporate income tax rate.136 Whether or not the company pays firm-level income
taxes,137 the company’s social action reduces its net income and thus the shareholder’s
investment earnings. If corporate income is distributed as dividend, the shareholder will
see a reduction in her taxable income. Thus corporate social action affords the
shareholder a further tax break equal to an above-the-line deduction. If the investment
earnings were accrued as capital gain, the shareholder would see a reduction in her
taxes in proportion to the capital gains tax rate rather than the personal income tax rate.
Because the capital gains rate is smaller than the labor rate for most investors,138
accruing investment returns as capital gains affords a smaller discount for altruism than
distributing those returns as dividends.
With so many moving parts (firm-level taxation, distribution of investment
earnings), it is hard to describe succinctly the tax treatment of purchasing altruism
through shareholding and corporate social action. Because the investment income most
134 If the had not risen in value since the taxpayer purchased it, there would be no capital gains tax
to begin with and the stock donation would be treated just like an equivalent cash donation.
135 Corporate donations have the additional benefit that they can be depreciated immediately.
These donations, however, are capped at 10 percent of net income. See Internal Revenue Code section
170(b)(2). Few corporations hit this threshold, since the average donation is about 1.5 percent of
corporate profits.
136 See, for example, Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of
Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 856-57 (1997) (noting that the tax code may privilege
corporate giving over shareholder giving, and concluding that this is inefficient in light of managerial
control over firms).
137 If the company is taxed at the firm level, this discount is equal to the corporate tax rate, which
is nominally 35 percent for the largest companies. If the company is able to opt out of Subchapter C, then
its income is not taxed at the firm level and it enjoys no discount on the price of altruism.
138 The capital gains tax rate will rise to 20 percent in 2010, but will fall to 10 percent for taxpayers
in the 15 percent personal income tax bracket. See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of
2005, H.R. 4297, Public Law No: 109-222 (2005).
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readily available to tax payers involves companies that pay corporate income taxes139
and because most shareholders accrue investment earning via capital gains, we shall use
these features to simplify our characterization of the tax treatment of shareholder
altruism. In this baseline case, buying altruism from a firm triggers two levels of
discount, first by the corporate tax rate and then by the capital gains rate. Because the
discounts are sequentially applied, the full discount is roughly tc(1 – tcg) + tcg where tc is
the effective corporate income tax rate and tcg is the capital gains tax rate. By contrast, a
cash donation to a non-profit yields a discount of tp equal to the effective personal
income tax rate. If investment earnings were distributed as dividend, which is taxed at
the personal income tax rate, it is clear the tax treatment of shareholder altruism would
be more favorable than the tax treatment of individual donations to non-profits. But
since most investment gains are accrued as capital gains, it is possible that individuals
with high personal incomes and thus tp > tc(1 – tcg) + tcg might find donations to nonprofits less costly than donations via stock.
A second way for individuals to obtain altruism from for-profit companies is to
purchase green goods. Although this is a rapidly growing portion of total purchases of
altruism, it is highly disfavored by the tax code relative to other forms of giving.
Individuals buying green goods, such as fair trade coffee, do so with after-tax income,
and therefore get no tax benefit under current tax rules. Consider two ways in which an
individual can help poor coffee farmers in Africa: (1) buy a regular coffee and make a
cash donation to a non-profit charity that gives aid to the farmers or (2) buy fair trade
coffee that bundles a donation with the purchase of regular coffee. All else being equal,
the first way is more efficient for the individual because the cash donation can be
deducted from income, while the donation part of a fair trade bundle cannot. If an
individual choose option (1), this leaves the individual able to donate more to charity or
consume more other goods or leisure per dollar earned than the individual buying green
goods.140
The final way that individuals can purchase altruism through a for-profit outlet is
to work at a company that does good deeds. Altruism purchased in this manner typically
generates an above-the-line deduction regardless of whether the employee is an
itemizer. For instance, if the company has a program that matches employees’ donations
to a non-profit charity, a profit-maximizing company lowers the wage it offers by the
amount of the donation it makes on the employee’s behalf.141 This reduction in wage
lowers the employee’s taxable income. Alternatively, if the company has a program that
pays employees to do volunteer work, also called pro bono work, presumably the profitmaximizing company presumably lowers the wage it pays on non-volunteer hours to
account for the lost productivity during the volunteer hours. Again the result is a
reduction in the employee’s wage. In this regard, altruism purchased through

Any company with publicly traded shares is taxed according to subchapter C, that is, pays
corporate income taxes.
140 Certain green goods, such as hybrid cars, are the target of government subsidies, but this
treatment is the exception rather than the rule.
141 The company is indifferent between donating a matching amount or paying the employee
more. Either way the expense is deductible, assuming the 10 percent cap on corporate charitable
donations does not bind.
139
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employment at a for-profit company is treated as volunteer work that reduces the hours
worked by an individual paid on an hourly basis.142

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu

142 There are two caveats to this description of the tax treatment of altruistic employees. First, if
the company’s shareholders do not dock the altruistic employee’s wage by their matching donation or paid
volunteer hours, they in effect decide to pay for altruism themselves. In that case it is the shareholder that
is paying for part of the employee’s purchase and it is the shareholder that receives a tax break. Second, it
is difficult for a company to adjust the wage of each individual employee based up the employee’s
participation in a work-sponsored charitable program. In general it can only adjust the wages of all
employees based on the participation of the average employee. This generates a sort of moral hazard
where each individual employee has an incentive to donate or volunteer more than average because there
is no cost in terms of lost wage. Indeed, there is a subsidy equal to the after-tax wage rate. To limit this
moral hazard, companies have to cap the number amount of matching donations or the amount of pro
bon work they permit.
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